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Chapter 1: Introduction 
“As it is fundamental to the social, economic, and environmental sustainability of 
every community and every political economy, water is a strategic resource.” 
 –J.A. Allen, “Water Security in the Middle East: The Hydro-Politics of Global Solutions” 
 
In 1991, soon before Boutros Boutros Ghali became Secretary General of the United 
Nations, he famously proclaimed, “the next war in the Middle East will be over water, not 
politics.”1 Although oil and Islamic sect differences beat water to the punch, Ghali’s 
comment represents an acknowledgement of the growing importance of water in 
international political and economic discourses worldwide. Today, the price of a bottle of 
water exceeds the spot price of oil, reflecting a coming age of unprecedented liquid scarcity.2 
Water is unlike any other natural resource. It is simultaneously a fundamental human 
right and a critical economic input. It has no substitutes and often transcends national 
boundaries, imbuing it with immense value and the potential for use as a potent weapon in its 
insufficiency. In May 2014, the United Nations declared water a “weapon of war in military 
conflicts.”3 4,500 years ago, Mesopotamian city-states Umma and Lagesh fought the only 
known war exclusively over water for control of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers in the 
marshlands of the Fertile Crescent (present day southern Iraq).4 Since then, while armed 
conflict over water has been avoided, disputing claims and tension among states over control 
of, and access to, water resources are by no means unusual. The United States and Mexico 
have squabbled over the Rio Grande and the Colorado, India and Pakistan for the Indus, and 
Egypt and Ethiopia along the Nile.5 However, as if the landscape remembers the blood that 
                                                
1 Adams, Water and Security Policy: The Case of Turkey, 1. 
2 Chellaney, Water, Peace, and War: Confronting the Global Water Crisis, xii. 
3 Deen, “U.N. Decries Water as Weapon of War in Military Conflicts.” 
4 Grover, Water: A Source of Conflict or Cooperation?, 7. 
5 Chellaney, Water, Peace, and War: Confronting the Global Water Crisis, xii–xiii. 
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ran next to the water 4,500 years ago, it is in the arid Middle East that tempers run highest 
over transboundary water resources.  
In a region already fraught with political and religious tumult, water seems more 
often to inspire predictions of dispute than extinguish them. In a 2013 Strategic Foresight 
Group study on worldwide water cooperation, the Middle East demonstrated the lowest trust 
and political will for cooperation among co-riparians, most systematic exclusion of one or 
more riparian state in negotiations, the least active cooperation, and, where treaties exist, 
least satisfactory mechanisms for dispute resolution.6 Among the international river basins of 
the Middle East, the Tigris-Euphrates, shared among Turkey, Iraq, and Syria is perhaps most 
cited as a hot spot for potential total water war.7  
The Tigris-Euphrates Basin is an interesting case as, unlike other water basins in the 
Middle East, it has historically had more than adequate water resources to support the 
populations of its three riparians.8 Yet it has been subject to equal, if not more, tension, 
dispute, and low-level conflict than many of the world’s other arid basins.9 In this project, I 
examine the tensions and disputes among the Tigris-Euphrates riparians over the Twin 
Rivers, their origins, changes over time, and the potential for conflict versus cooperation in 
the future. I argue that water was a low politics, cooperative issue between the end of the 
First World War and the early 1960s, the subject of conflictual high politics interactions 
between 1960 and the turn of the century, and from 2000-2010 remained in high politics but 
became the object of more collaborative engagement. I assert that the perception of scarcity 
and actual shortages serve to drive water from low to high politics and that the oscillation 
                                                
6 Strategic Foresight Group, Water Cooperation for a Secure World: Focus on the Middle East, 41, 48, 63, 82. 
7 Starr, “Water Wars”; Elhance, Hydorpolitics in the third World: Conflict and Cooperation in International River Basins; Barkey, Reluctant Neighbor: 
Turkey’s Role in the Middle East. 
8 Schulz, “Turkey, Syria, and Iraq: A Hydropolitical Security Complex,” 105; Dolatyar and Gray, Water Politics in the Middle East, 117–118; Sowers, 
Vengosh, and Weinthal, “Climte Change, Water Resources, and the Politics of Adaptation in the Middle East and North Africa,” 606–607. 
9 Strategic Foresight Group, Water Cooperation for a Secure World: Focus on the Middle East. 
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from cooperative hydropolitics to conflictual and back follows the ebb and flow of wider 
politics dictated by diplomatic relations, influence of external actors, economic ties, and the 
saliency of ethnic and ideological similarities and differences. In this way, I show that water 
politics follow the pattern of overall bilateral and trilateral relations among the three riparian 
states. 
This introductory chapter will outline the relevant literatures and theories relating to 
water conflict and cooperation and introduce my research question and analytical framework. 
The second chapter divides the history of the Tigris-Euphrates into three time periods and 
closely follows hydropolitics as they change among the riparians over time. The third chapter 
analyzes the change over time illustrated during chapter two and endeavors to explain why 
water politics have fluctuated in the Tigris-Euphrates Basin. The conclusion briefly applies 
my analytical framework to the events of present day and considers potential forms water 
politics may take in the basin in the future.  
Literature Review 
In a world of rapidly expanding population, growing consumption, and changing 
environment, questions about how environmental systems interact with issues of security, 
politics, economics, and social change are becoming increasingly pressing. Of particular 
interest is the question of how environmental changes, including depletion and degradation, 
may influence security. The field of environmental security has emerged to study the way 
that resources and the environment relate to security concerns and interactions among states. 
The most pressing question within this issue area is: are environmental changes and resource 
scarcity, degradation, and depletion more likely to stimulate conflict among affected actors or 
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encourage cooperation? The following literature review discusses how scholars have 
attempted to answer this critical question.  
Conflict and Cooperation: Definitions     
 Throughout the scholarly literature, the uses and meaning of the terms “conflict” and 
“cooperation” are ambiguous and varied. They are both broad and multifaceted concepts that 
authors rarely define explicitly. I define the terms generally here, and utilize them throughout 
the literature review that follows as they are interpreted and employed by the scholars I 
discuss. 
Drawing from Frey (1993) and Uitto and Wolf (2002) conflict occurs among “two or 
more entities, one or more of which perceives a goal as being blocked by another entity, 
[when] power of some sort [is] exerted to overcome the perceived blockage.”10 Conflict most 
often arises from competition and is associated with negative forms of interaction.11 As 
Grover (2007) discusses, conflict can be based on economic, social, political, and 
institutional blockages.12 Although the term is most often used to describe instances of 
violence, it also includes nonviolent or less organized violent engagement, such as social 
protest.13 Sosland (2007) suggests that conflict arises as a result of three different types of 
stimuli: deep, intermediate, and precipitating.14 Precipitating causes occur immediately 
before the onset of conflict; intermediate causes occur farther in time from the onset of 
conflict and may include a series of controversial events or an ongoing issue of dispute; and 
deep causes include historical points of contention and underlying prejudices.15 
                                                
10 Frey, “The Political Context of Conflict and Cooperation Over International River Basins,” 57; Uitto and Wolf, “Water Wars? Geographcal Perspectives: 
Introduction,” 289. 
11 Grover, Water: A Source of Conflict or Cooperation?, 3–4. 
12 Ibid., 3. 
13 Dabelko, “An Uncommon Peace: Environment, Development, and the Global Security Agenda,” 250. 
14 Sosland, Cooperating Rivals: The Riparian Politics of the Jordan River Basin, 5. 
15 Ibid. 
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 Throughout the relevant literature, the term “cooperation” is also similarly used to 
describe a range of interactions among actors. According to Frey (1993), cooperation 
constitutes, “working together for common benefits …[and] implies coordination of behavior 
among actors to realize at least some common goals.”16 In contrast to conflict as a form of 
negative engagement, cooperation is generally regarded as a positive form of interaction. 
Cooperation among state or non-state actors ranges from “informal contact for consultation 
and information exchange” to treaties or codified legal agreements to joint ventures and 
authorities.17 These broad definitions drawn from the literature help to frame the forthcoming 
discussion of the theories of environmental conflict and cooperation. 
Environmental Warmongers: The Resource Conflict Thesis 
 
 In recent years, world leaders, scientific experts, and scholars alike have expressed 
the concern that the earth’s finite resources will be at the heart of the 21st century’s conflicts. 
In 1987, the United Nations World Commission on Environment and Development published 
the Our Common Future report, widely regarded as the seminal work on environmental 
security. The report asserts, “Environmental stress is both a cause and an effect of political 
tension and military conflict. Nations have often fought to assert or resist control over raw 
materials, energy supplies, land, river basins, sea passages, and other key environmental 
resources. Such conflicts are likely to increase as these resources become scarcer and 
competition for them increases.”18 In support of such conclusions, numerous scholars concur 
that resources can serve as direct or indirect causes of violent conflict.  
                                                
16 Frey, “The Political Context of Conflict and Cooperation Over International River Basins,” 57. 
17 Dolatyar and Gray, Water Politics in the Middle East, 8–9. 
18 World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future, 290. 
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Scholars argue that resources are often the direct cause of conflict when they are 
scarce. In such a “simple-scarcity” conflict,19 under conditions of a finite resource 
endowment, “conflict may arise between states over access to vital sources of supply, and 
within states over the distribution of the limited materials available.”20 Similarly, “Even in 
the absence of debilitating scarcities, conflict among states may arise from the belligerent, 
resource-expansionist claims of one or more states.”21 Simple-scarcity conflict most often 
applies non-renewable resources, such as minerals and oil.22 The 1991 Gulf War is an often-
cited example of a “simple-scarcity” conflict motivated by the desire to gain control of oil 
reserves.23  
The environmental security literature also suggests that resources provide an indirect 
causal pathway to conflict. Günther Bächler and Thomas Homer-Dixon argue that, by 
causing or contributing to economic decline, migration, demographic pressure, or state 
weakness, environmental transformations (i.e. resource depletion, scarcity, and degradation) 
can exacerbate existing ethnic, social, political, or economic divisions within society and 
result in upheaval.24 According to Bächler, “Violent conflicts triggered by the environment 
due to degradation of renewable resources (water, land, forest, vegetation) generally manifest 
themselves in socioeconomic crisis regions of developing and transitional societies if and 
when social fault lines can be manipulated by actors in struggles over social, ethnic, political, 
and international power.”25 Environmental and resource degradation or scarcity can thus act 
as a “threat multiplier.” 26 Changes in a resource stock or environmental quality “are stressors 
                                                
19 Homer-Dixon, “Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence From Cases,” 18. 
20 Klare, Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict, 20. 
21 Elhance, Hydorpolitics in the third World: Conflict and Cooperation in International River Basins, 4. 
22 Homer-Dixon, “Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence From Cases,” 19. 
23 Ibid., 18. 
24 Bächler, “Why Environmental Transformation Causes Violence: A Synthesis”; Bächler, Violence Through Environmental Discrimination, xvi; Homer-Dixon, 
“Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence From Cases,” 32. 
25 Bächler, “Why Environmental Transformation Causes Violence: A Synthesis,” 25. 
26 Johnstone and Mazo, “Global Climate Change and the Arab Spring,” 11–17; European Commission, Climate Change and International Security, 2; United 
States Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 84. 
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that can ignite a volatile mix of underlying causes that erupt into revolution”27 or violent 
conflict. Stresses caused by resource scarcities, inequities in access, or environmental 
degradation can provide an additional grievance for an already aggrieved group that may tip 
the scale towards conflict. Thus, as an indirect cause or threat multiplier, a resource or 
environmental condition may not provide the root cause of conflict, but rather acts as either 
an intermediary or the decisive factor that transforms other sociopolitical divisions or 
grievances into conflict or revolution. Recent work has suggested that the Arab Spring 
revolutions that shook the Middle East beginning in 2011 were partially attributable to 
droughts that impacted food prices and supply, providing the added stress necessary to 
transform deep political grievances into violent uprising.28 Thus, while the precise 
mechanisms vary, the above-discussed authors largely concur that environmental change and 
scarcity can and will play an increasingly critical causal role in the conflicts of the 21st 
century. 
Resource Peace Advocates 
In opposition to those who argue that the environment will serve as a source of 
conflict in years to come are those who argue that states, communities, and individuals are 
far more likely to cooperate over shared resources than they are to conflict. These theorists 
can be divided into three categories: 1) scarcity skeptics; 2) non-conflict theorists; and 3) 
environmental cooperation scholars.  
While environmental conflict scholars take environmental change and eventual 
scarcity as a given, scarcity skeptics question the very idea that resource scarcity will a) ever 
exist, or b) come to be a cause for conflict. Economist Julian Simon forwards the argument 
                                                
27 Slaughter, “Preface,” 1. 
28 Johnstone and Mazo, “Global Climate Change and the Arab Spring”; Werrell and Femia, “The Arab Spring and Climate Change: A Climate and Security 
Correlations Series.” 
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that population growth does not necessarily create pressure on finite resources.29 He posits 
that, in the long run, human ingenuity and market forces allow for technological 
advancements that can provide substitutes for nearly every natural resource supposedly 
threatened by scarcity.30 Daniel Deudney critiques the environmental conflict thesis on 
largely the same grounds. He argues that states will not war over resources because: 1) “the 
robust character of the world trade system means that states no longer experience resource 
dependency as a major threat to their military security and political autonomy;” and 2) “the 
world is entering…the ‘age of substitutability,’ in which industrial civilization is increasingly 
capable of taking earth materials such as iron, aluminum, silicon and hydrocarbons…and 
fashioning them into virtually everything needed.”31 Thus, these scholars suggest that 
because human ingenuity and material substitutability will overcome scarcity and resource 
degradation constraints, conflicts over resources are implausible.  
Most environmental cooperation scholars acknowledge the existence of scarcity and 
environmental change as a challenge for environmental management, but suggest that 
conflict is not the rational response to such conditions. Jack Goldstone writes, “Where the 
problem faced by two groups, or two nations, is over the degradation or depletion of an 
environmental resource, war neither solves the problem (it cannot make more of the 
resource), nor is it an economically efficient way to redistribute the resource (the costs of war 
almost invariably far outweigh the cost of gaining alternative resources or paying more for a 
share of the resource).”32 When a state or group fears it will soon face resource scarcity 
because of the actions of another state or group, it is argued that the actor will take 
anticipatory precautions to safeguard resource access in order to either prevent it from 
                                                
29 Simon, The Ultimate Resource. 
30 Ibid.; Simon, The Ultimate Resource 2. 
31 Deudney, “The Case Against Linking Environmental Degradation and National Security,” 279. 
32 Goldstone, “Demography, Environment, and Security,” 90. 
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becoming a source of contention or keep it from being used as a form of coercion.33 
Similarly, it is suggested that the modern state system is not conducive to resource conflict. 
Deudney argues, “The prospects for resource wars are diminished, since states find it 
increasingly difficult to exploit foreign resources through territorial conquest.” 34 Thus, 
according to Erika Weinthal and Avner Vengosh, resources are more likely to create dispute 
on the sub-national level, where they raise issues of development, quality, equity, and public 
participation, rather than prompting violent interstate conflict.35 While newly formed, post-
Soviet states in Central Asia have cooperatively managed their shared rivers,36 intra-state 
disputes about dam construction and displacement are commonplace, such as that in India’s 
Narmada valley,37 supporting this viewpoint. 
The most optimistic cooperation theorists assert that the need to manage 
environmental degradation and depletion provides actors with an opportunity for 
cooperation. Proponents of this view suggest that, “resource scarcity based on environmental 
degradation tends to encourage joint efforts to halt such degradation…just as scarcity may 
lead to conflict among states, it is often due to scarcity that states tend to cooperate.”38 The 
inherent interdependences that arise when two or more actors share a resource create an 
imperative for cooperation of some kind.39 Stressing the immense historical precedence of 
environmental negotiations and agreements,40 Ken Conca, a leading theorist in the 
environmental cooperation field, asserts that “environmental peacemaking goes far beyond 
simply forestalling environmentally induced conflict…environmental cooperation can be an 
effective general catalyst for reducing tensions, broadening cooperation, fostering 
                                                
33 Kelanic, “Black Gold and Blackmail,” viii. 
34 Deudney, “The Case Against Linking Environmental Degradation and National Security,” 279. 
35 Weinthal and Vengosh, “Water and Conflict: Moving from the Global to the Local,” 266–267. 
36 Weinthal, From Environmental Peacemaking to Environmental Peacekeeping, 19. 
37 Rajagopal, “The Violence of Development.” 
38 Dinar, International Water Treaties: Negotiation and Cooperation along Transboundary Rivers, 10–11. 
39 Elhance, Hydorpolitics in the third World: Conflict and Cooperation in International River Basins, 6, 14. 
40 Conca, “Environmental Cooperation and International Peace,” 225. 
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demilitarization, and promoting peace.”41 According to Conca, there are two pathways 
through which addressing environmental issues may encourage actors to cooperate: 1) 
“changing the strategic climate,” which amounts to trust-building and lengthening timelines, 
and 2) “strengthening post-Westphalian governance,” which entails creation of a shared 
identity that renders conflict unthinkable.42 It is argued that Canada and the United States’ 
successful collaboration to overcome uncertainty and address acid rain43 enhanced the two 
states’ overall relationship. While many scholars suggest that this particular thesis—that 
environmental factors can actually lead to greater overall cooperation among states—requires 
more research and empirical testing, all the above scholars form a consensus around the idea 
that actors are far more likely to cooperate over scarce and changing environments than they 
are to conflict.  
Water Wars? 
Erika Weinthal suggests that, whether intentionally or not, much of the environmental 
conflict and cooperation literature either directly discusses water conflict/cooperation in 
particular, or has water in mind when considering environmental and resource dynamics in 
general.44 There is no doubt that water, as both a life necessity and critical economic driver, 
is a powerful resource with the potential to both ignite dispute and inspire collaboration. 
Shared river basins and transboundary rivers are the most commonly discussed water body in 
environmental conflict and cooperation literature, as they create particularly interesting and 
problematic dynamics among competing riparian states. The following sections will examine 
the environmental conflict and cooperation theses as they pertain to water and transboundary 
rivers in particular.   
                                                
41 Conca, Environmental Peacemaking, 9. 
42 Ibid., 10. 
43 Conca, “Environmental Cooperation and International Peace,” 231. 
44 Weinthal, From Environmental Peacemaking to Environmental Peacekeeping, 19. 
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When Does Water Scarcity Lead to Conflict? 
 Water is a beloved subject of resource conflict literature. According to Thomas 
Homer-Dixon, water is the only renewable resource likely to be subject to simple-scarcity 
conflicts,45 and Joyce Starr proclaims, “water security will soon rank with military security in 
the war rooms of defense ministers.”46 The water wars thesis posits that, because 
“international water [is] a critical, nonsubstitutable resource, which flows and fluctuates 
across time and space, for which legal principles are vague and contradictory, and which is 
becoming relatively more scarce with every quantum or growth in population or standards of 
living,”47 the 21st century will be characterized by wars over water.  To summarize, the fact 
that water is important, maldistributed, shared, and increasingly scarce48 gives it the potential 
to both directly and indirectly cause conflict.  
In an effort to make this theoretical line of argument more nuanced, Peter Gleick has 
identified five distinct ways in which water plays a role in conflict: 1) water inequities as the 
root of conflict; 2) water condition as the root of conflict; 3) water or water systems as a 
strategic political or military goal; 4) water or water systems as a strategic political or 
military tool; and 5) water or water systems as a strategic military target. 49 Under type one, 
individuals, groups, or entire countries may squabble over an unequal distribution of water, 
as occurred in the 1970s in China when upstream villages made excess withdrawals from the 
Zhang River, sparking downstream village militia attacks.50 Similar disputes may occur in 
the context of type two conflict, whereby one actor is perceived as having polluted or 
diminished the water quality faced by another. States or non-state actors employ type three 
                                                
45 Homer-Dixon, “Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence From Cases,” 19. 
46 Starr, “Water Wars,” 19. 
47 Wolf, “Conflict and Cooperation along International Waterways,” 253. 
48 Frey, “The Political Context of Conflict and Cooperation Over International River Basins,” 54. 
49 Gleick, “Water and Conflict,” 84–93; Gleick, “Environment and Security: The Clear Connections,” 19–20; Lonergan, “Water and Conflict: Rhetoric and 
Reality,” 118. 
50 Gleick, “Water Conflict Chronology List.” 
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water conflict when they attempt to gain control of another’s vital water resources or water 
infrastructure. The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has used such tactics, prioritizing 
towns and infrastructure along the Tigris and Euphrates rivers to rapidly gain control of inner 
Syria and Iraq.51 Water can be used under type four as a coercive political or military tool by 
an upstream state to gain concessions from a downstream actor, such as in 1997 when 
Malaysia threatened to stop water flow to Singapore in retaliation for Singapore’s criticism 
of Malaysian policies.52 Type five is perhaps the most common: dams, canals, irrigation 
systems, and other water infrastructure are often targeted or attacked during conflict 
otherwise unrelated to water. During World War II, Germany purposefully destroyed over 
two thirds of Soviet hydroelectric systems in an attempt to weaken Soviet resistance.53  
While it is clear that water and conflict have a complicated and varied relationship, 
environmental conflict theorists certainly imbue water with the potential to make enemies of 
neighboring individuals, groups, and states. As climate change alters the planet’s weather 
dynamics, increasing precipitation in some regions, and starving others of rain, already 
precious freshwater resources in shared basins are almost certain to become more scarce, 
increasing the chances for those subscribing to the water wars thesis to see their theories 
become reality.  
The Proven Potential of Hydro-cooperation 
Environmental cooperation theorists also put in their two cents about the possibility 
of water wars. Scarcity skeptics like Bjorn Lomborg suggest, “the problem is not that there is 
too little water, but that it is used poorly”54 and argue that correct water pricing, which would 
drive more efficient use of the Earth’s finite water supply, would address perceived scarcity 
                                                
51 Watkins and Yourish, “A Rogue State Along Two Rivers.” 
52 Gleick, “Water Conflict Chronology List.” 
53 Ibid. 
54 Lomborg, “Resource Constraints or Abundance?,” 148. 
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and reduce the likelihood of dispute. 55 J.A. Allan concurs with this hypothesis and suggests 
that technological and societal changes, such as trade in “virtual water” (goods that are 
water-intensive to produce, i.e. food), will keep scarcity at bay56 and thus eliminate any need 
for conflict.  
Though recognizing rising scarcity as a major challenge for water management, other 
scholars suggest the implausibility of water wars based on the preeminence of other issues in 
foreign policy. Jon Barnett writes, “if there is a conflict over water, then that conflict is the 
result of failure of politics to negotiate a settlement over the shared use of water. The idea 
that a war over water, or any other resource, is not a war about politics is dubious.”57 
Similarly, Aaron Wolf makes three arguments against the likelihood of water conflict on the 
bases of 1) strategic interests; 2) shared interests; and 3) institutional resiliency.58 His 
strategic interest argument states that the high costs and nebulous goals of a water war would 
rarely, if ever, be in the strategic interest of a state—upstream or downstream.59 Wolf’s 
shared interests approach argues that, whether it be for flood control, agricultural 
development, or mutual use of a boundary river, the very existence of a transboundary 
waterway creates interdependences and shared interests that disincentivize conflict.60 Finally, 
Wolf’s institutional resiliency argument suggests that efforts to cooperatively manage water 
are cumulative: “once cooperative water regimes are established…they turn out to be 
tremendously resilient over time, even between otherwise hostile riparians and even as 
conflict is waged over other issues.”61  
                                                
55 Ibid. 
56 Allan, The Middle East Water Question: Hydropolitics and the Global Economy, 32. 
57 Barnett, The Meaning of Environmental Security, 56. 
58 Wolf, “Conflict and Cooperation along International Waterways.” 
59 Ibid., 259. 
60 Ibid., 259–260. 
61 Ibid., 260. 
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Such theories have led scholars to characterize water as a likely candidate for “low-
profile”62 or “tactical functional”63 cooperation. According to Sosland,  
States in a protracted conflict that are interdependent on an important functional issue, such as shared 
water resources, may cooperate tactically…Over time, the process of two parties in a protracted 
conflict meeting and discussing a divisive issue may lead to a change in a state’s preferences. A new 
idea—positive personal relationship among technocrats and elites—and a new sense of trust and 
confidence may move parties toward a common understanding of a problem and its solution.64 
 
In such a way, Sosland, along with Dolatyar and Gray (2000), Conca (2001, 2002), Elhance 
(1999), and Dinar (2008) hint at the possibility that joint action over water may eventually 
lead otherwise conflictual states to cooperate, possibly not only on issues relating to water, 
but beyond. An example of such cooperation is the Israel-Jordan “Picnic Table Talks.” In the 
last 60 years, though the two states have moved in and out of political confrontation, the 
water managers have continued low-profile meetings several times a year to jointly manage 
their shared rivers.65 While some scholars are more optimistic than others—dreaming that 
Jordan and Israel’s picnic talks can be recreated in river basins the world over—at the heart 
of all water cooperation authors’ arguments is the assertion that active collaboration is more 
likely than conflict over shared water resources. 
Empirical Tests 
 The preceding hypotheses regarding the potential for environmental, and in particular 
water, conflict have been the subject of cross-national empirical investigations worth 
mentioning here. In an examination of the link between environmental degradation and 
conflict, Wench Hauge and Tanja Ellingsen find that “countries suffering from 
environmental degradation…are more prone to civil conflict”66 (emphasis added) and that 
economic and political factors are more important than environmental ones in predicting the 
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incidence of civil conflict.67 While Hauge and Ellingsen do not examine the relationship 
between environmental factors and interstate conflict, their results do illustrate a link 
between environmental conditions and violence. In a different vein, Hans Petter Wollebaek, 
Nils Petter Gleditsch, and Håvard Hegre examine whether location on a shared river basin 
makes a country more prone to interstate violence. Their results find that, indeed, “shared 
river dyads have a higher frequency of dispute outbreak than contiguous dyads,”68 leading 
them to conclude, “there is something to shared rivers as a source of conflict. Whether that 
‘something’ is mainly water scarcity is not clear.”69 To lend some support for the water 
cooperation theorists side of the argument, Aaron Wolf conducted an in-depth examination 
of “cases of international conflict where armed exchange was threatened or took place over 
water resources.” 70 Reaching the conclusion that no war has ever been fought over water, 
Wolf suggests that the concept of a “water war” lacks any historical precedence.71 Thus, 
while efforts have been made to definitively determine the answer to the question of whether 
environmental conditions, specifically with regard to water, are more likely to provoke 
conflict or cooperation, even historical and empirical analysis leaves the question open. 
Empirical studies have made it clear that, to a certain extent, both theses are correct—water 
can provoke dispute under some conditions, and cooperation under others. There is ample 
room within the field to further specify what those conditions are that encourage cooperation 
and which motivate conflict.  
Under What Conditions? 
 None of the above scholars argues that the pure existence of water, or another 
resource, results in either conflict or cooperation. Rather, they each suggest a wide variety of 
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intervening variables that make either conflict or cooperation more likely in a given 
circumstance. This section outlines those variables, answering the question: under what 
conditions is conflict or cooperation over shared water more likely?  
Scarcity 
 Scarcity, and especially that which is perceived as induced by another actor (as 
opposed to the effects of growing populations or drought) can make conflict more likely. In 
the words of Michael Klare, “However divided [or undivided] two states or societies may be 
over matters of politics or religion, the likelihood of their engaging in mutual combat 
becomes considerably greater when one side believes that its essential supply of water, food, 
or energy is threatened by the other.”72 Scholars also make a distinction between “perceived” 
and “real” scarcity, both of which are seen as having the potential to motivate conflict.73  
Existing Political Context  
The existing political relationship between the two states is said to have a potent 
impact on the potential for conflict or cooperation. According to Sosland, “When riparians 
are engaged in an extended cold war, strained political and military relations make 
cooperation more difficult and outright conflict more probable.”74 Based on her analysis of 
the Jordan River Basin, Miriam Lowi takes this reasoning a step further to suggest that as 
long as a political conflict exists, a water dispute will not be resolved cooperatively. 
According to Lowi, the prerequisite for cooperative water management is the resolution of 
any and all protracted political conflicts.75 Thus, when two states have no protracted political 
conflict, they are more likely to engage collaboratively over transboundary water 
management.  
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Historical Relations 
 States that have worked together historically, especially through joint management of 
a security issue, are more likely to cooperate when it comes to water challenges. Sosland 
writes, “states are more apt to have a cooperative strategy on functional issues if they have 
already improved their relationship by working together to balance a common security 
threat.”76 When states do not have a strong foundation of cooperation on other issues, water 
becomes more likely to provide a source of conflict. 
Interdependencies 
 It is also suggested that the degree of interdepence among states play a role in their 
willingness to initiate conflict or pursue cooperation. High degrees of transnational contact 
encourage cooperation.77 Jon Barnett writes, “Military action to secure resources is unlikely 
given the interdependence among states in the global economy”78 and it is suggested that a 
high degree of interdependency among states makes them more likely to give up some degree 
of sovereignty.79 Conca highlights economic interdependence (i.e. high levels of trade) as 
one of, if not the, most important form of interdependence for encouraging cooperation 
among states that also share environmental challenges.80  
Similarities Among States 
Theorists also find the extent of similarity among states to be important in their 
predisposal toward cooperation or conflict over water resources. Common language, shared 
perceptions of the problem, similar uses of the river, and uses of the same technologies for 
water management make a cooperative outcome more likely.81 Additionally, Wolf suggests 
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that the thesis asserting that democracies do not go to war with each other also applies to 
democratic states that share a river,82 thus implying that similarities in regime type may 
engender cooperation among riparians. 
Existing Ethnic and Ideological Divides 
 The ethnic and ideological makeup of a river basin can influence the likelihood of 
conflict or cooperation. According to Conca, “Environmental problems are most combustible 
when they exacerbate existing social tensions based on class, religion, or ethnicity. When 
such tensions are triggered in the absence or weakness of social institutions that otherwise 
could mediate disputes or in the context of ‘failing’ states, it is said, violent conflict may be 
triggered or worsened.”83 Ethnic or religious divisions thus have the potential to encourage a 
more negative, conflictual outcome in a riparian dispute. 
Trust 
 Trust, whether it be among state leaders or technocrats, is a key prerequisite to 
cooperation.84 It is argued that mistrust and uncertainty are characteristic of negative, 
conflictual interactions.85 Thus, LeMarquand suggests that, “confidence must be felt between 
neighbors before they are willing to commit treasured natural resources to interdependent 
development and management”86 of shared resources.  
Power Asymmetries 
 Applying hegemonic stability theory to river basins, Lowi suggests, “If the dominant 
power in the basin will benefit from regional cooperation in water utilization, it will take the 
lead in creating and maintaining a regime.”87 In theory, downstream states will be 
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predisposed to cooperate because of their being at mercy to the upstream state, and therefore 
a basin will be cooperative only if the upstream riparian elects to cooperate.88 
Issue Linkage 
 In countries where a high level of conflict is common, riparians often link issues. 
States create an “agreement with a neighbor for an international river scheme that the 
neighbor wants [in order to] gain concessions for other bilateral issues.”89 While many 
authors suggest this as an important method of forwarding cooperation, Sosland argues, 
“when a state has a general preference toward violent conflict or even war…that preference 
may be strategically linked to the water scarcity issue in an ideological and nationalistic 
manner to create international discord.”90 Thus, while issue linkage is an important 
bargaining technique for states and can encourage cooperation, the political and religious 
context, and the exact issue water is linked to, matters and can make conflict more likely.  
Existence of Common Patron or Influence of an External Actor  
 The scholarly literature suggests that, when a third party or external actor becomes 
involved in a riparian dispute to mediate, whether it is an international organization, other 
state, or NGO, the chances for cooperative resolution are generally higher. According to 
Elhance, “sustained international initiatives and support are often needed to overcome the 
many barriers to interstate cooperation in hydropolitics and to persuade and enable the 
respective riparian states to see cooperation as a “win-win” situation for all concerned.”91 On 
a somewhat similar note, Sosland suggests that two states are more likely to cooperate if they 
have a common patron.92 
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National Image 
 The degree of concern a riparian has for its national image can influence the position 
it takes in negotiations and motivate a more cooperative or conflictual outcome. If a country 
is pursuing a “good neighbor policy” or looking to be “a model of cooperative international 
behavior” it will seek more positive resolution. Conversely, if states, especially those 
upstream, choose to be “candidly egocentric,” a more negative outcome is likely.93  
Sovereignty and Nationalism 
When states are concerned about breaches of sovereignty, they are less willing to 
cooperate. This is especially true in situations where water has come to be intertwined with a 
state’s sovereign national identity. Klare writes that, for many countries, “disputes over water 
have taken on a deeply emotional or symbolic character, as matters of national (or regime) 
survival and identity.”94 When a regime draws some or much of its legitimacy from river 
control or development, it is less likely to pursue coriparian cooperation for water 
management. 
Commitment of High Level Officials 
 When high level officials (i.e. those in positions of power above technocrats and the 
bureaucracy) have a vested interest, or make a commitment to cooperative resolution, a 
positive outcome is more likely. According to LeMarquand, “if the chief executive of the 
basin countries can be motivated to make a commitment to resolve the issues, definitive and 
innovative solutions may be more easily accomplished than if negotiations are left to the 
representatives of the government departments.”95 That being said, the reverse is also posited 
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to be true: leaders that define cooperative water management as in opposition to the national 
strategy reduce the impetus for positive resolution.96 
Epistemic Communities 
 Peter Haas articulates the concept of epistemic communities, which make cooperative 
resolution of a transboundary environmental dispute more likely. Epistemic communities are 
“transnational networks of knowledge based communities that are both politically 
empowered through their claims to exercise authoritative knowledge and motivated by 
shared causal and principled beliefs.”97 Such groups—consisting of water experts, 
technocrats, and bureaucrats—after working together to manage a resource, form 
relationships and shared connections that can help encourage cooperation regardless of the 
political climate. In Haas’ words, “if the group of specialists share a common world view or 
believe in the same set of cause-and-effect relations, then they are likely to be particularly 
influential, because they will resist the political temptations to subordinate their advice to 
existing political concerns,”98 and can thus maintain cooperative resource management when 
larger political relations among states deteriorate. 
Economic Modernization 
The processes by which states utilize shared water bodies for economic 
modernization has the potential to stimulate competition and conflict. Klare suggests that 
damming rivers and unilateral efforts to increase supply for a certain population’s use make 
conflict more likely99 by giving the upstream riparian control over the taps of downstream 
users. However, Wolf suggests that “a dam…can not only provide hydropower and other 
benefits for the upstream riparian, but it can be managed to even out flow for downstream 
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agriculture, or even to enhance water transportation for the benefit of both riparians.” 100 
Thus, when projects that manipulate river flow are conducted jointly among states or 
competing users, or when shown to equally benefit multiple actors, they may in fact foster 
cooperation. 
Analytical Framework 
While water conflict and cooperation have been examined extensively, most authors 
study them dichotomously, i.e. attempting to determine which factors will lead states to take 
up arms against each other versus which motivate them sign treaties over water. While some 
authors, like Gleick and Sosland, have acknowledged that water wears a variety of hats in 
conflict and can be cooperative at a level below fully codified, the existing literature does not 
portray water conflict and cooperation as a spectrum. The preceding section has illustrated 
how water conflict and cooperation have been discussed so far throughout scholarly 
literature. In the section that follows I use the above theories to outline my analytical 
framework, in which I treat water conflict and cooperation as two ends of a spectrum along 
which a diverse array of factors dictate where a particular transboundary water body at a 
particular time falls.  
The Spectrum of Conflict and Cooperation 
 
 In my conflict—cooperation framework, state interaction ranges from armed conflict 
and less severe negative forms of engagement, to positive interactions such as joint projects 
and treaties/codified agreements. The cooperation—conflict spectrum is shown below.  
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Figure 1: Spectrum of Conflict and Cooperation 
 
High and Low Politics 
 
 Throughout my analysis of the Tigris-Euphrates basin, I will consider whether water 
plays into the relationships among Turkey, Syria, and Iraq as an issue of high or low politics. 
Conventional wisdom suggests that “’high politics’ of security and survival ha[s] priority 
over the ‘low politics’ of economic and social affairs.”101 High politics has many 
characteristics in common with foreign policy, while low politics is often synonymous with 
issues of domestic policy. Jackson writes that foreign policy is a  
Separate sphere from domestic politics and activities of sovereign states. It [is] the realm of ‘high 
politics’ defined and guided by reason of state, now more commonly labeled ‘national interests.’ It [is] 
directed and managed by the leading state officials (emperors, kings, presidents, prime ministers, 
chancellors, secretaries of state, foreign ministers, defense secretaries, etc., and their closest advisors.) 
It [is] not subject to popular scrutiny or democratic control. It [is] an exclusive and often secretive 
sphere of statecraft.102  
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For the purposes of my analysis, I consider “high politics” to constitute foreign policy issues, 
dealt with by heads of state or high-level ministers and concerning the security, sovereignty, 
and territorial integrity of the state(s) in question. I consider “low politics” to include more 
functional, technical, administrative issues, often confined to domestic politics, considered 
less crucial to national security or territorial integrity, and primarily managed by lower level 
bureaucrats and technocrats.  
Theoretic Model for Hydro-Cooperation and Hydro-Conflict 
 As the theoretical literature suggests, water can enhance cooperation or exacerbate 
conflict among states. The question remains, when do we expect to see more positive or more 
negative interstate interactions? The “under what conditions” section within the preceding 
literature review outlined the most commonly identified intervening variables in the 
literature. On the following page, I depict a schematic diagram illustrating how 
transboundary water bodies can provide sources of both positive, cooperative and negative, 
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In this model, scarcity is the key factor that creates the potential for conflict over 
water. Without either a perception of limited supply or an actual shortage, water cannot 
provide a basis for competition or, at the extreme, conflict. Real and/or perceived scarcity—
which stems from either climatic conditions/drought or unilateral development that creates 
either a perception or reality of deprivation—is the factor that drives water from low politics 
to high politics. As J.A. Allan suggests, “when news of a water deficit is widely known, the 
issue of water security can become an issue of high politics”103 With water in the realm of 
high politics, the environmental conditions are filtered through the social, political and 
economic context, which determines the outcome on the conflict-cooperation scale. The four 
most important intervening variables, as illustrated on the diagram above, are: 1) the 
character of diplomatic relations, which includes existing political relationships or disputes, 
and ties or alienation among heads of state or high level officials; 2) the influence of external 
actors or outside political allegiances, which encompasses both direct intervention by a third 
party in negotiations and more indirect influence of patron states or international 
organizations; 3) the existence or lack of trade or other economic linkages among states; and 
4) ethnic/ideological similarities and differences, which include ties or alienation stemming 
from religion, ethnicity, or governing doctrine. When real or perceived water scarcity does 
not exist, there is little to no potential for competition or conflict, so the potential outcomes 
range only over the positive interaction side of the conflict-cooperation spectrum from no 
interaction to treaties/codified agreements. 
Turkey, Iraq, and Syria’s Tigris-Euphrates Basin 
 
The Middle East is often flagged as the region where water conflict is most likely to 
occur due to both its extraordinary dryness and its politically tumultuous landscape. In 
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suggesting that the Middle East will be the host of the 21st century’s “water wars,” scholars 
are making an assumption about how water politics relate to other political issues. They 
assume that water will be more conflictual when in a context otherwise characterized by 
negative relationships among states. While this is a reasonable assumption to make—it is 
well established that the implications of transboundary water in any given case will be 
filtered through the particular environmental, sociopolitical, and economic circumstances of 
that case—there is little scholarly work that considers precisely how water issues interact 
with other policy issues among states, and why they interact in the ways they do.  
Widely cited as a “hot spot” for future water conflicts,104 the Tigris-Euphrates Basin, 
shared among Turkey, Syria, and Iraq, is an interesting case to consider in order to better 
understand how hydropolitics interact with other factors in states’ relationships. The Tigris-
Euphrates inspires calamitous predictions because of 1) the many other potent points of 
contention among the three riparian states; 2) a predicted age of unprecedented scarcity; and 
3) the lack of codified agreement or treaty that allocates Tigris and Euphrates waters among 
the three riparians. Are such predictions of impending tripartite conflict warranted? What do 
the lessons of the past have to tell us about how water politics intertwine with other politics 
among these three states? 
My analysis considers the likelihood of positive and negative interaction in the Tigris-
Euphrates case not based upon the magnitude of scarcity/environmental degradation or 
record of negotiations, as has been done,105 but through comparison of the change over time 
in the trajectory of water politics and that of other sociopolitical and economic relations. I 
show how the water politics of the Tigris-Euphrates basin were largely cooperative and low 
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politics between 1918 and the early 1960s and moved to the realm of high politics and 
became more conflictual in the years between 1960-2000. In the period between 2000 and 
2011, water remained a high politics issue, but became dramatically more cooperative.106 My 
research question is thus: why has water oscillated among positive and negative forms of 
interaction and between high and low politics? In other words, what factors drive the roller 
coaster of hydropolitics in the Tigris-Euphrates basin? Is scarcity the critical driver of water 
relations? Or does the path of hydropolitics follow the trajectory of broader political, 
economic, and social relations? Can the influence of external actors dictate a basin’s 
hydropolitics? How are water politics shaped by ethnic and ideological factors? Having 
answered these questions, what are the implications of the hydropolitics of the Tigris-
Euphrates today and in the future, and can these conclusions be applied to other river basins? 
In answering these questions I apply the above-delineated frameworks to determine 
what roles water plays in the relationships between Turkey, Syria, and Iraq, and what factors 
influence whether riparian relations are positive or negative. I argue that the mechanism that 
dictates whether water is a high or low politics issue is scarcity, both real and/or perceived, 
stemming from climatic conditions/drought or unilateral, upstream water development. The 
driver of the Tigris-Euphrates water politics’ oscillation from cooperative to conflictual and 
to cooperative once again is not scarcity or equity of access, as is often suggested, but rather 
the security implications of other political, economic, and social issues that may have been 
linked to water or create conditions for cooperative or conflictual relationships overall.107 In 
opposition to those who suggest that water scarcity will lead to conflict or encourage 
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cooperation, I suggest that water in the Tigris Euphrates basin has not thusfar been a “cause” 
for either negative, conflictual relations or positive, cooperative interaction. Rather, water 
politics have followed the tenor of other political, social, and economic issues that shape 
relations among Turkey, Iraq, and Syria, and have yet to provide an independent source of 
dispute. As would be predicted by the power asymmetry thesis, the upstream state, Turkey 
often sets the tone of both hydropolitics and wider political relationships in the Tigris-
Euphrates. Turkey’s foreign policy choices have the largest implications for tripartite basin 
relations overall and Syria often holds the cards in its relationship with downstream Iraq.  
Although armed conflict over Tigris and Euphrates waters exclusively is unlikely, it is still 
important to understand why water is drawn into politics and under what conditions it 
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Chapter 2: The Tigris Euphrates Basin Over Time 
 
 
Figure 3: The Tigris and Euphrates Rivers108 
 
The Tigris-Euphrates basin’s history can be divided into three time periods, and 
within each, water has played a distinct but consistent role in the domestic and foreign policy 
of the three riparian states. From the fracturing of the Ottoman Empire in 1918 to the 
beginning of large-scale hydro-development in the late 1950s and early 1960s, water was low 
on the political agendas of the three riparian states and reflected the relatively cooperative 
climate of the times. From 1960 to 2000, as hydro-development took off, water’s power as a 
economic and political tool was recognized, it was elevated to a central position in high 
politics and fueled dispute among the three riparian states. Between 2000 and 2011, though 
remaining in high politics, water policy among Turkey, Iraq and Syria became more positive 
and collaborative. This chapter will illustrate these oscillations in hydropolitics from low 
cooperative to high conflictual and high conflictual to high cooperative, and the following 
chapter will explain this variation over time. 
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Time Period 1: 1918-1960 
 After the end of the First World War and up until the late 1950s/early 1960s, water 
was a low politics issue in Turkey, Iraq, and Syria, and the hydropolitics of the Tigris-
Euphrates Basin were comprised of positive, cooperative interactions among the three 
riparian states. When addressed, the water issue was managed by lower level technical 
bureaucrats from the three states and was embedded in management of other economic and 
social policies. During this period, the three states (or their colonial puppeteers) entered into 
treaties and agreements that were primarily focused on defining their basic bilateral 
relationships but also included brief references to cooperative water management.  
New States and New Hydro-Relationships  
At the end of the First World War, the Ottoman “sick man of Europe” breathed its 
final breath, and Europe carved up the deceased empire into the Middle East’s modern 
nation-states, transforming the Tigris-Euphrates Basin into a transboundary river system. 
British-controlled Iraq was comprised of old Ottoman districts, Baghdad, Basra, and 
Mosul,109 and contained the lower 1060km of the Euphrates and 1418km of the Tigris.110 
Syria, made up of the old Greater Syria minus Jordan, Palestine, and Lebanon,111 was given 
to France in 1920 and included 710km of the Euphrates and 32km of the Tigris forming its 
border with Turkey.112 Turkey arose at the heart of the old Ottoman Empire in Anatolia 
where originate the headwaters of both the Euphrates and Tigris, which then flow for 
1230km and1850km respectively before exiting Turkish territory.113 While Iraqi nationalists 
did not win independence from the British until 1932 (and even then much British 
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institutional structure remained)114 and France did not give Syrians independence until 
1941,115 the man who would become the father of modern Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, 
expelled the British and established the Turkish Republic in 1923.116 It was under such 
conditions of semi-autonomy and rapid state consolidation that Turkey, Iraq, and Syria began 
to manage their rivers. 
During this period, water was treated as a low politics, primarily domestic issue. 
Between the breakup of the Ottoman Empire and the 1960s, “transboundary waters were the 
subject of domestic planning and development exercises and had little to do with the foreign 
policy agenda. Those involved in transboundary water relations at that time were…medium-
level technocrats, advisers, and professionals who prepared the technical ground for the 
drafting of the water-related clauses of the treaties.”117 Thus, water was largely an 
administrative, rather than foreign policy, concern in this first period, and the external water 
policy that did exist prior to the late 1950s was very much embedded within the creation of 
overall bilateral relations and the finalization of territorial claims among the three newly 
independent riparian states. 
Several treaties, aimed at establishing peace among the three states, address water 
within other cooperative frameworks and form the basis for the positive hydropolitical 
interactions among Turkey, Iraq, and Syria during this period. The agreements, their dates, 
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Year: Treaty Name: Parties: Provisions Regarding Tigris and Euphrates Use: 





“Any plans for irrigation in Syria that might diminish ‘in any 
considerable degree’ the flow of the Tigris or Euphrates were 
to be examined by a commission nominated by the two 
governments.”118 





“The city of Aleppo may organize, at its own expense, a water-
supply from the Euphrates in Turkish territory in order to meet 
the requirements of the district.”119 
1923 Treaty of Lausanne Turkey, 
Britain (Iraq) 
“’Turkey should confer with Iraq before beginning any 
activities that may alter the flow of the Euphrates’ (Bakour and 
Kolars 1994: 139).”120 







Required Turkey to increase the flow of the Koveik river or 
authorize off-take of Euphrates flow to satisfy the needs of 
irrigated areas around Aleppo within Syria.121 
Also mandates that “water disputes would be resolved ‘on the 






Established the Commisson on the Demarcation of the Turco-
Syrian Frontier.123 
Affirmed previous agreements and committed the two states to 
coordinate any planned utilization of Euphrates water.124 




Turkey, Iraq Delineates rights and responsibilities of both states regarding 
Tigris and Euphrates water. 
Turkey would begin monitoring the rivers and share data. 
Turkey would report to Iraq on any plans to develop Euphrates 
and Tigris waters, allowed for separate negotiations. 
Iraq could construct dams within Turkish territory for flood 
prevention (construction cost born by Iraq, maintenance costs 
shared). 
Established that most suitable dam sites for flood prevention 
were in Turkey.125 
Table 1: Water-related Treaties of 1918-1960 
As the provisions of these treaties illustrate, the riparian relationships among the three states 
were positive and cooperative between 1918 and the 1950s. Though none of these treaties are 
tripartite or establish measurable river rights, they highlight the degree to which the three 
states interacted collaboratively with regard to water during this time period. As all of these 
treaties were primarily designed to deal with territorial and security issues unrelated to water, 
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and addressed water as a subordinate, technical, and administrative concern, water inhabited 
the realm of low politics.  
Time Period 2: 1960-2000 
 
 At the end of the 1950s, the hydropolitical dynamics among Turkey, Syria and Iraq 
began to change considerably. Between 1960 and 2000, the three states experienced recurring 
friction over the waters of the Tigris-Euphrates Basin. During this time period, water was 
catapulted from its minor, technical role within low politics to become intertwined with 
issues of high politics, at times taking center stage on the agendas of presidents and prime 
ministers. The newly recognized power and importance of water in interstate relations drove 
conflicting claims for the Tigris-Euphrates waters and repeatedly came close to providing the 
impetus for war. 
The Troubled Waters of Development 
 
By the early 1960s, Turkey, Iraq, and Syria had each designed ambitious 
development projects for their stretches of the Tigris and the Euphrates. Although the 
potential for the twin rivers to fuel development and economic improvement in the three 
riparian states was acknowledged before the 1960s,126 this decade marked the early 
implementation of large-scale water projects. As all three states faced growing populations 
and escalating energy demands, they looked to the Tigris and Euphrates. Turkey and Syria, 
both of which barely used the Tigris or Euphrates waters prior to the 1960s, began rapid, 
ambitious development projects to harness the waters’ potential. Iraq, where water 
infrastructure dated back to the 1930s (and even pre-WWI),127 expanded the goals and altered 
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the scope of its projects, like its neighbors, increasing the demands it placed on the two 
rivers.  
Turkey 
In 1955, an ambitious young Turk, Süleyman Demeril, was named director of the 
State Hydraulics Works (DSI). Demeril, who would go on to be elected Prime Minster ten 
years later, came to be known as Turkey’s “King of Dams.”128 The name was not 
unwarranted—during his stint at DSI, Demeril oversaw most of the planning for the 
Southeastern Anatolia Project, which involved the construction of 22 dams and 19 
hydroelectric power plants on the Tigris and Euphrates in Turkey’s nine poorest provinces.129 
As Prime Minister, he championed the project as key to Turkey’s development and defended 
it against the sharp criticisms of Turkey’s southern neighbors.130  
The Southeastern Anatolia Project (Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi--GAP) in its early 
formulations was primarily targeted toward meeting Turkey’s growing energy and 
agricultural needs. In 1970, close to 60 percent of Turkey lacked electricity and a growing 
industrial sector in the western part of the country was driving a rapidly rising demand. 
Energy needs were predicted to increase 9.5 percent from 1990-2000 and seven percent from 
2000-2010.131 Similarly, increasing oil prices in the 1970s sparked a push for Turkish energy 
independence.132 As one of the most oil-poor nations of the Middle East, Turkey looked to 
use GAP to capitalize on its remarkable hydroelectric capacity. Early predictions showed 
GAP increasing Turkey’s hydroelectric production to take advantage of 45 percent of the 
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country’s 100billion KW hydroelectric potential, supplying 25 percent of Turkey’s overall 
electricity.133 Turkey’s population more than doubled between 1950 and 1980, and, with 
annual growth rates of 2.2 percent, was expected to exceed 70 million by 2000.134 Turkey 
hoped to maintain food security throughout its rapid growth and improve its balance of 
payments with exports of $20 million worth of profitable cash crops to the rest of the Middle 
East.135 With 40 percent of Turkey’s arable land located in the nation’s southeast, GAP’s 
multipurpose dams would irrigate 1.6 million ha area for agriculture while providing 24 
billion KW of electricity.136 
GAP evolved to include broader development goals. With per capita income in the 
GAP region only 47 percent of the national average, DSI hoped the hydro-development 
project would spark general industrial and economic expansion to close the country’s 
socioeconomic gap.137 Through improved standards of living and growing employment 
opportunities, GAP also aimed to prevent emigration from the GAP region and better equip 
local cities to attract and manage growing populations.138 However, despite these largely 
benevolent goals, the Turks were not unaware of the implications GAP would have for their 
control of, and claim to, the Tigris and Euphrates waters. In a 1970 feasibility report, DSI 
reportedly wrote, “In the absence of a water treaty among riparian interests, precedence of 
beneficial use becomes an important criterion in the adjudication of water rights.”139 Thus, 
while the motivations for Turkey’s design and implementation of GAP were largely 
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economic, Turkey was not blind to the implications its control of the Tigris and Euphrates 
would have for its relationships with co-riparian states. 
 
 
Figure 4: Hydro-development on the Tigris and Euphrates in Turkey140 
 
 
Turkey initiated its hydro-development with the construction of the Keban Dam on 
the Euphrates between 1966 and 1973.141 Keban was followed between 1976 and 1987 by the 
Karakya dam, also on the Euphrates. In securing funding for these dams, Turkey faced World 
Bank concerns about water flow to Iraq and Syria and assured the World Bank that Syria 
would receive at least 450-500m3/s. Despite these promises to the World Bank, Turkey at the 
time did not provide the same guarantees to Syria and Iraq themselves.142 Because of the lack 
of basin-wide agreement on Turkey’s project, Turkey lost World Bank support for GAP in 
1980 as it began the plans for the project’s crown jewel, the Atatürk Dam. Unlike its 
forerunners, Atatürk stored a large volume of water for irrigation and thus was perceived as 
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more substantially impacting downstream flow to Iraq and Syria.143 Despite funding 
challenges, GAP continued, primarily financed from Turkish state coffers.144  
Ninety-eight percent of the Euphrates flow originates in Turkey, and upon 
completion, GAP would provide Turkey with control of 40 percent of that river’s waters 
flowing into Syria and 80 percent of Tigris and Euphrates waters to Iraq.145 Just over half of 
GAP projects are located on the Euphrates and those that focus on irrigation would drain the 
river of 30 percent of its average annual flow.146 From Syria and Iraq’s perspectives, these 
figures clearly raise a red flag. However, GAP has one underrated benefit for Turkey’s 
downstream neighbors: the dams’ regulation of the Euphrates and Tigris flow, which, prior to 
Turkish development, exhibited dramatic seasonal fluctuations and caused damaging floods 
in all three states.147 Despite the mix of beneficial and potentially harmful effects of Turkey’s 
GAP project, water scholar John Waterbury has pointed out that “Turkey could claim, 
although [there is] no evidence that it has, that it has undertaken at its own expense precisely 
the kinds of works provided for in the 1946 treaty,”148 in which Iraq gave Turkey the right to 
undertake flood control projects on the two rivers provided that Turkey communicate its 
plans to Iraq.  
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Atatürk Dam (1990) 2400MW 852,781 ha Dicle (1997) 110MW 218,920 ha 
Biriçek Dam (2000) 672MW 70,000 ha Kralkizi Dam (1997) 94MW 80,000 ha 
Karkamiș Dam 
(2000) 
180MW N/A Batman Dam (1999) 185.6MW 37,744 ha 
Total: 5400MW 1,083,000 
ha 
Total: 5960MW 558,000 ha 
Table 2: Major Dams of the Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP)149 
 
Syria 
In the mid-20th century, Syria faced increasing energy and agricultural demands 
similar to Turkey’s. With a population growing at an annual rate of 3.6 percent and 
electricity demand at rising at close to 20 percent per year in the latter half of the 20th 
century, 150 Syria felt a pressing need to employ the waters of the Tigris-Euphrates Basin for 
agricultural production and energy provision. After Soviet-funded surveys of Euphrates dam 
potential in the late 1950s, Syria established the Syrian General Establishment of the 
Euphrates Project in 1961.151 The Syrian Euphrates Project, also known as the Euphrates 
Valley Project, was officially launched in 1966 when Syria began construction of the Soviet 
and German funded Tabqa Dam.152 The Syrians had ambitious plans for the dam: irrigating 
850,000 ha and producing 800MW of electricity.153 The Tabqa was completed in 1973 and 
its reservoir was filled by 1975 to create the 11bilion m3 Lake Assad.154 Following the 
initiation of Tabqa, Syria set up the General Administration for the Development of the 
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Euphrates Basin in 1968, which hatched plans for nine hydropower projects to be launched 
by 1988.155   
 
                   
Figure 5: Hydro-development on the Euphrates in Syria156 
 Despite ambitious goals, many of Syria’s projects were seen as a disappointment, 
particularly the Tabqa dam. Although the dam provided 60 percent of Syria’s electricity by 
the turn of the century and accounted for close to 100 percent of the water supply to 
Aleppo,157 its irrigation and energy production has fallen well short of its goals. The Soviet 
design of the dam did not account for the land’s uneven topography, so the dam regularly 
fails to meet full electricity demands during seasonal river fluctuations.158 Similarly, while 
exact figures vary, there is widespread consensus that Tabqa’s predicted agricultural 
expansions of an additional 650,000 ha of irrigated farmland were not realized due to Syria’s 
high gypsum content soils (gypsum is quite soluble, leading to the collapse of irrigation 
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channels built in gypsum-rich soils).159 In fact, Syria’s irrigated land area fell by close to 20 
percent between the 1960s and 1990s, due to salinization, inundation, waterlogging and 
changing land laws.160 Syria’s salinization problems, along with lower-than expected energy 
and irrigation output can be attributed to both its physical characteristics and changes in flow 
stemming from completion of Turkey’s upstream projects.161 Despite challenges, Syria went 
forward with a plan to install pump irrigation for 150,000 ha on the Tigris in 1989162 and 
followed the Tabqa dam with construction of the Al-Baath and Tishrin dams in 1986 and 
1999 respectively.163 Though environmental factors have limited the success of Syria’s 
hydro-development projects, as in Turkey, the Tigris and Euphrates have been viewed and 
utilized as tools to boost Syria’s economy and provide food and energy to her populations.  
Iraq 
Iraq’s hydro-development has followed a similar model. With an ample supply of oil and 
relatively flat topography164 (which limits the construction of large dams necessary for 
hydroelectric production), Iraq’s development ambitions on the Tigris and Euphrates 
originally emphasized flood control, irrigation, and desalinization. Iraq’s modern river 
development began earlier than her upstream neighbors--in 1939 with the construction of the 
Al-Kut Barrage165 (a barrage is a low dam) and followed in 1956 with the Habbaniya project 
and Samara and Euphrates Barrages for flood control.166 By the 1960s, Iraq was irrigating ten 
times as much land as Turkey and five times as much as Syria.167  
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Figure 6: Hydro-development on the Tigris and Euphrates in Iraq168 
 
Despite topographical challenges, Iraq was keen on opportunities to produce cheap 
hydropower at home and reserve petroleum for export. By the latter part of the 1970s, half of 
Iraqi electricity was provided by hydropower.169 In the mid-1970s, with Soviet aid, Iraq’s 
Higher Agricultural Council, Land Reclamation Organization, and Ministry of Irrigation 
created the General Scheme for Planning Water and Land Resources of Iraq (also known as 
the “Revolutionary Plan”170), which involved investing $300 million in 20 irrigation, 
hydropower, flood control, and water storage projects to be completed by 2000.171 Though 
Saddam Hussein’s rise to power in 1979 altered the state’s land and water bureaucracy, it did 
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not slow water development. The Haditha Dam for irrigation and hydropower was completed 
in 1987, followed by the Baghdadi Dam, begun in 1990. A system of barrages and dams 
lower on the Euphrates, including the Hindaya, Fallouja, and Hammourabi, all constructed in 
the 1980s, provide irrigation, diversion, and regulation.172 While much of Turkey’s 
development of the Tigris is in progress, and Syria’s is close to non-existent, Iraq’s Mosul 
dam on the upper Tigris has been providing up to 750MW of power and irrigating nearly 
250,000 ha of farmland173 since 1983.174 
 The most unique and ambitious of Iraq’s development projects is the Third (or 
Saddam) River. Beginning as the Thartar Canal, the idea was to connect the Tigris and 
Euphrates through a reservoir and canal, allowing Iraq to supplement any decreases in 
Euphrates flow with water from the Tigris. However, the plan evolved to consist of a 
350mile-long navigable canal between the two rivers that facilitates Iraq’s transfer of water 
from the Tigris to Euphrates and back while simultaneously removing excess irrigation 
drainage water from fields around Baghdad and desalinizing polluted agricultural land in the 
south near Basra.175 The Third River, for which construction was completed in 1992, 
eventually empties into the Persian Gulf alongside Tigris and Euphrates waters.176 While the 
final configuration of the project has received ample international criticism on environmental 
and human rights grounds (the ecologically rich Mesopotamian Marshes, home to the Shi’ite 
Marsh Arabs who historically opposed the Iraqi regime, were drained in creation of the Third 
River),177 both Syria and Turkey were in support of Iraq facilitating the transfer of water 
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between the Tigris and Euphrates178 as it justified, to a certain degree, continued 
development on the Euphrates in the two upstream states.179 
1960s: Unproductive Negotiations and Competing Claims 
Recognizing their potentially competing claims for Tigris and Euphrates waters, the 
three states convened during the early phases of designing and implementing their schemes. 
After Syria announced its plans to construct the Tabqa Dam in 1962,180 the riparians entered 
into a series of ultimately unproductive technical bipartite and tripartite talks attended by 
mid-level economic ministers from the three countries that lasted until the early 1970s.181 At 
a 1962 meeting between Syria and Iraq, the two states agreed to exchange technical 
information regarding river flow182 and in a meeting between Turkey’s Ministry of Energy 
and Natural Resources and equivalent Iraqi representatives signed agreements for similar 
exchanges of information.183 In a 1965 tripartite meeting (the first meeting of representatives 
from all three states), following the recommendations of a World Bank report,184 Turkey 
suggested the creation of a Joint Technical Committee to evaluate the two rivers’ flow and 
the needs of the three riparians to ensure an equitable division.185 The initially promising 
negotiations turned sour after the three states announced their respective development plans’ 
demands for the rivers: Turkey 14 billion cubic meters, Iraq 18 billion, and Syria 13 billion. 
The demands added up to a full one and a half times (15 billion cubic meters) more than 
actual river capacity.186 While Turkey agreed in 1966 to guarantee at least 350m3/s of flow 
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during the impounding of the Keban Dam on the Euphrates, the first dam of its development 
project for Southeastern Anatolia, no long-term agreement was reached during the series of 
negotiations.187    
During these meetings, Turkey staked a claim to the Tigris and Euphrates based on 
the principle of absolute territorial sovereignty whereby a state “has an unrestrained right to 
use the water resources within its own territory.”188 Brismar (2002) has argued that part of 
Turkey’s motivation for GAP was the need to exercise this claim to the river189 and 
undermine its neighbors’ claims of historical rights. Iraq expressed its claim of historical or 
acquired rights to use of the Tigris and Euphrates based on the fact that it was the first of the 
three riparian states to develop water projects along the rivers.190 Syria similarly claimed 
acquired rights and riparian rights, which dictate, “every state along the course of a river has 
an inherent right to the water of that river, which is not to be diminished or degraded without 
that state’s concurrence.”191 These competing claims led to full blown crisis in the mid-
1970s. 
The Crisis of 1975 
 By the end of 1973, both Turkey and Syria’s first large dams were relatively complete 
(Keban in Turkey and Tabqa in Syria), and full functionality waited only on the filling of 
their respective reservoirs. Unfortunately, the timing for filling the dam reservoirs coincided 
with two years of drought.192 During the first season that spring flood waters were 
impounded behind both reservoirs, Iraq, the farthest downstream state, experienced dramatic 
drops in water levels, and so requested that Damascus release an additional 200m3/s 
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downstream. The following year, as the two upstream dams once again decreased flows to 
fill their reservoirs, Iraq accused Syria of diminishing the flow from the usual 920m3/s to an 
“intolerable” 197m3/s,193 and keeping more water than necessary in Lake Assad behind 
Tabqa dam for political reasons.194 Iraq blamed Syria for loss of 70 percent of Iraq’s winter 
crops and the suffering of more than three million Iraqi farmers,195 and called upon the Arab 
League to intervene.  
Amidst this crisis, Syria and Iraq came close to engaging in armed conflict. After 
Syria refused to cooperate with first an Arab League, then a Saudi Arabia-mediated, 
resolution and closed her airspace to Iraq, the two states sent troops to their mutual border 
and suspended flights. Despite Syria’s claims that she was passing on more than two thirds of 
the water coming to her from Turkey, Iraq threatened Syria that it was prepared to “take any 
action necessary to ensure the Euphrates flow”196 and there were reports of Iraqi plans to 
blow up the Tabqa dam. The tense situation was not helped when a Syrian soldier was 
discovered on the Iraqi side of the border placing explosives inside Kerbala, an Iraqi holy 
city.197 
Tensions finally died down after Soviet and Saudi mediated efforts convinced Syria 
to agree to release additional water downstream to Iraq. There are conflicting accounts as to 
the precise agreements: Rubin and Kirisci cite an additional 200m3/s per year as the agreed 
upon extra water flow from Syria, while Naff and Matson credit a Syrian decision that 60 
percent of Euphrates water that got to Syria from Turkey would go on to Iraq and 40 percent 
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would be utilized in Syria.198 Despite the fact that the filling of the Keban dam contributed to 
the lack of water downstream in Syria and Iraq, Turkey was never brought into this crisis.  
Missed Shots at Peace 
Following the drama of the mid-1970s, the 1980s heralded a multitude of failed 
attempts to find a peaceful resolution to the Tigris-Euphrates issue. In 1980, Turkey and Iraq 
agreed to establish a Joint Technical Committee (JTC) for Tigris and Euphrates 
cooperation.199 Syria began attending JTC meetings in 1983 and, although 16 trilateral JTC 
meetings were held over the following 10 years, they were primarily concerned with fact-
finding and communications to determine how to begin to allocate the basin’s waters. 
Unfortunately, the JTC had no real power and did not succeed in catalyzing a trilateral 
agreement. JTC meetings deteriorated in the early 1990s and would not be reinstated until the 
mid-2000s.200  
To assuage the fears of its downstream neighbors and share its water abundance with 
the rest of the Middle East, Turkey’s then Prime Minister, Turgut Özal proposed two “Peace 
Pipelines” in the mid 1980s.201 The Peace Pipeline project would have sent water from the 
Seyhan and Ceyhan rivers in Turkey through the “Western Pipeline” to several large 
metropolitan areas in Syria and Jordan and through the “Gulf Pipeline” to urban centers in 
Iraq, Kuwait, Saudia Arabia, Oman, Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates.202 While 
the project appeared feasible environmentally and financially (the necessary $20 billion was 
fronted by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and Islamic 
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Development Bank),203 it was ultimately politically unpalatable to the other states of the 
Middle East. Key pipeline states Saudi Arabia and Kuwait cited concerns related to higher-
than-local water prices and fear of Turkish water monopoly in the region.204 
The 1987 Protocols 
Conflictual water politics inhabited the top of riparian agendas amidst security crises 
of the late 1980s, and between Turkey and Syria became linked Kurdish militancy. In 1986, 
Syrian Prime Minister Abd Al-Rauf Al-Kasm “stressed that the Euphrates was of vital 
importance to Syria, and implied that if during the building of the major dams of GAP, 
Turkey retained an excessive amount of Euphrates’ waters, Syria could retaliate with other 
means.”205 By “other means,” the Syrian regime intimated that any action on Turkey’s part to 
decrease downstream flow would result in Syria upping its support for militants, like those of 
the Kuridstan Worker’s Party (PKK), inside Turkey.206  In 1986, 25 people were arrested 
throughout Anatolia after a plot was discovered to plant explosives in Atatürk Dam and blow 
up connected parts of GAP.207 Though the men were caught before they were able to carry 
out their plan, Turkish authorities discovered that Syria had funded the attack out of concerns 
that the entirety of Euphrates flow would be cut off upon completion of GAP.208 
On the heels of this diplomatic fiasco, Turkey and Syria came to a temporary 
agreement in 1987. At back-to-back economic and security meetings with participation of 
both Turkish and Syrian Prime Ministers, Turkey and Syria signed protocols designed to 
delink water politics from security politics. In the economic protocol, Turkey promised to 
maintain a yearly average Euphrates flow of 500 cubic m/s while filling Ataturk Dam 
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reservoir and until an official, tripartite allocation was reached.209 In the following protocol, 
“Cooperation on Security Problems,” Syria promised to extradite insurgents (it was implied 
that Syrian and Turkish leadership referred to the PKK in the use of the term “insurgents”) 
and both sides would “prevent activities against the other from originating in their 
countries.”210  
Although it initially seemed that both sides would hold to the agreements, in 1989, 
after PKK militants captured in Turkey continued to admit to being trained and backed by the 
Syrians, Turkey’s Özal stated that “he had doubts that Syria was adhering to the Mutual 
Security accord signed in 1987…[and] added that if Syria did not stick to the requirements of 
the 1987 accord Turkey would also see itself not bound by the requirements of its 1987 
promise to deliver 500 cubic meters of water per second downstream.”211 The failure of the 
1987 agreement to elicit cooperation on Turkey and Syria’s mutual water and security 
concerns laid the unsteady foundations for water politics to once again tip the scale towards 
armed conflict among the three riparians, in 1990. 
The Crisis of 1990 
 In 1989, Turkey began to herald the coming completion of the Atatürk dam, crown 
jewel of its Southeastern Anatolia Project. Turkey announced to downstream riparians, Syria 
and Iraq, that, in January of 1990, Turkey would begin a month-long diversion of Euphrates 
flow in order to fill the Atatürk reservoir.212 With river levels predicted to drop to 120m3/s, 
Turkey planned to release extra water (750-1000m3/s) in the months before it began 
impoundment in order to guarantee that flow levels did not fall below the 500m3/s agreed 
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upon in 1987.213  Prior to impoundment, the Turkish Foreign Ministry even sent 
representatives to both Damascus and Baghdad to make guarantees to the downstream states’ 
governments that filling of the Ataturk dam was “not a political maneuver to apply pressure 
on our neighbors,” and noting that Turkish farmers between the Atatürk dam and the Syrian 
border would also be affected during the month of impoundment.214  
 Despite these seemingly friendly reassurances, Turkey’s choice to continue with dam 
impoundment despite an ongoing drought was perceived as purposeful water hostility from 
Ankara and not taken well south of Turkey’s border. Both Syria and Iraq demanded that the 
impoundment period be shortened and Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq, which claimed that 
the country stood to lose 1.3 million hectares of agricultural farmland in the month of 
diminished Euphrates flow, “considered the Euphrates problem as the most important issue 
between the two neighbors.”215 Syria opposed Turkey on the grounds that the diminished 
flow would largely snuff out the water supply to Aleppo.216 Iraq, feeling excluded from Syria 
and Turkey’s 1987 agreement on 500m3/s Euphrates flow, called for a trilateral treaty that 
guaranteed a Euphrates flow of 700m3/s out of Turkey. When Turkey was unwilling to meet 
such demands, Iraq threatened to deny renewal of the 1984 Turkey-Iraq Security Protocol 
(which gave Turkey permission to pursue militants up to 5km into Iraqi territory) and there 
were reports of Iraqi threats to bomb Euphrates dams in Turkey217 if Ankara did not 
compromise on the water issue.218 Just days before dam impoundment began, a group of 
PKK fighters with Syrian ID cards was caught crossing Syria’s border into Turkey. Though 
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the incident was never expressly linked to the impending Euphrates diversion, it has been 
suggested that the actions were characteristic of a covert Assad response to the water issue.219 
To Ankara’s dismay, the filling of the Atatürk dam reservoir finally united Syria and Iraq 
on water concerns. Both feeling the victim of Turkey’s unilateral development, Syria and 
Iraq in late 1990 reaffirmed their prior agreement that Syria would utilize 42 percent of the 
flow out of Turkey and allow 58 percent to continue on to Iraq.220 After the Atatürk reservoir 
impoundment was completed and flow returned to normal, tempers cooled between Turkey 
and the two downstream riparians.221 Despite Iraq and Syria’s brief cooperation, the Gulf 
War, which started mere months after the impoundment, widened the gap between Baghdad 
and Damascus, diminishing their combined leverage against Turkey.222 Although the Atatürk 
dam incident was largely forgotten about after flows returned to normal, it had made its mark 
on the physical landscape—a 70-mile dry brown area stretched from the Turkish border to 
Lake Assad where Syrian farmers had been unable to irrigate their crops during the month-
long diversion.223 
The End of an Age 
 After the Atatürk Dam crisis, the water issue remained largely at an impasse for the 
last 10 years of the century. The dam crisis effectively ended the little tripartite cooperation 
that existed throughout the 1980s with the end of Joint Technical Committee meetings in the 
early 1990s.224 Turkey was scheduled to host the Middle East Water Summit in November 
1991, but it was cancelled in light of the outbreak of the Gulf War, collapse of the Soviet 
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Union, and death of then Turkish President Özal.225 Meanwhile, Turkey and Syria continued 
to exchange threatening words related to water and separatist militants, and animosities 
among all three regimes remained. In 1999, soon after the leader of the PKK, Abdullah 
Öcalan was expelled from Syria and captured by Turkish officials, Turkey increased water 
flow to Syria.226 
 Though the 20th century ended on a relatively conciliatory note, the tenor of water 
politics since 1960 was more-often-than-not negative and conflictual. As has been illustrated, 
water during this time period remained primarily in the arena of high politics. Dealt with by 
prime ministers and presidents, it raised dispute among the three riparian states alongside 
central security issues. During the following time period, between 2000 and 2010, water 
would remain in high politics but prove a far less divisive issue among the Tigris-Euphrates’ 
three riparian states. 
Time Period 3: 2000-2010 
“If we ask a Turk living on the banks of the Euphrates whether he wants his Syrian brother to 
go without water he will reply, ‘Absolutely not.’”–Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, 2004227 
 
 The coming of the new millennium marked a dramatic change in Turkey, Syria, and 
Iraq’s water power politics. While the latter half of the 20th century often brought bilateral 
and trilateral tension and conflict, the 21st opened to a decade of unprecedented cooperation 
among all three riparian states. Despite violence and political upheaval in Iraq, and the worst 
drought in centuries afflicting the Tigris-Euphrates Basin, water no longer served as a source 
of dispute among the three states during this time period. Though it remained largely in high 
politics, dealt with by presidents, prime ministers, and other top-level officials alongside 
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security concerns, it was an arena of cooperation rather than contention. During this time 
period, while dramatic progress was made in bilateral and trilateral discourse about water, no 
treaties were implemented, nor permanent water allocations agreed upon.  
Hydro-Cooperation: New Views for a New Millennium 
 The Tigris-Euphrates co-riparian states rang in the new millennium with renewed 
bilateral water cooperation on all fronts. In January 2001, Iraq and Syria held talks to reach a 
new water sharing agreement.228 Although the agreement’s specifics, which included a 
“formula for sharing the waters of the Euphrates between Iraq and Syria,”229 were never 
made public, the agreement was largely intended to represent a call upon Turkey to initiate 
trilateral discussion on the water issue.230 Syria and Iraq reiterated the desire for tripartite 
cooperation in 2005. According to The Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA), Syrian Premier 
Mohammed Naji Ottri received Iraqi Minister of Electricity Abdullateif Rasheid, and 
Minister of Water Resources, Mohsen Shalash, in June to sign an agreement indicating 
Syrian and Iraqi intentions to sustain their exchange of Euphrates river operational, climatic, 
and hydrological data and to contact Turkey to revive the tripartite Joint Technical 
Committee.231 Syria also articulated a plan to release extra water from its dams to help spur 
much-needed Iraqi electricity production.232 
Although Turkey did not attend either of Iraq and Syria’s early meetings,233 the two 
Arab states were not alone in their bilateral progress in the first years of the 21st century. In 
August 2001, Syrian Minister of irrigation Taha al-Atrash visited sites on Turkey’s 
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Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP)234 as part of a larger Turkish-Syrian cooperation on 
river development. The administration for Turkey’s GAP project and its counterpart in Syria, 
the General Organization for Land Development (GOLD), signed a joint communiqué for 
cooperation on the two projects.235 Turkey and Syria planned to exchange information 
regarding water quality and irrigation management and to collaborate on research, training, 
agricultural education programs, and even some environmental protection and rural 
development projects.236 On the one-year anniversary of Syria and Turkey’s Joint 
Communiqué, Syrian Minister of Irrigation Ridwan Martini appreciated Turkey’s awareness 
of the Syrian peoples’ need for water and stated that “waters flowing from Turkey to Syria 
should bring happiness to the peoples of both countries.”237 This sentiment was echoed after 
Syria’s new president, Bashar al-Assad, met with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan during his first-ever visit to Turkey in 2004. According to Assad, the Turks brought 
up the water issue during the meeting and presented a new proposal for cooperation.238 While 
the details were not publicized, the proposal led Assad to state in an interview with Milliyet, 
“In my opinion neither the Syrian State nor its people have any problem with Turkey over 
water.”239 Though not conclusive in terms of a more permanent bilateral water agreement, 
this statement represents a remarkable about-face from Syria’s view of Turkey’s use of the 
Tigris-Euphrates waters just five years earlier. 
While bilateral cooperation on the water issue in the early 2000s was more limited on 
the Iraq-Turkey front, it was not altogether non-existent. In 2003, on a visit of Turkey’s 
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Energy and Natural Resources Ministry to Iraq, Turkey announced plans to sell Iraq water. In 
addition to electricity transmissions and diesel oil sales, it was agreed that Turkey’s State 
Hydraulic Works (DSI) would both transport water from a purification facility in the 
southeastern Sanliurfa province to Iraq and support Iraq’s agricultural irrigation efforts.240 To 
this end, Turkey in 2004 provided Iraq’s newly reformed Ministry of Water Resources with 
water flow data.241 According to Lorenz (2008), “This was significant because the parties 
ha[d] long treated flow data as a national security secret.”242 
As is evident, the early part of the new millennium’s first decade was characterized 
by promising bilateral cooperation on all sides. Though Syria and Iraq’s calls for a tripartite 
meeting were not yet answered, the dialogue occurring on all sides represented remarkable 
progress since the previous period. Many of the above discussions and agreements were 
conducted in tandem with security and military negotiations, and, as discussed, it was often 
high level technocrats or even heads of state involved in these bilateral water negotiations. 
Three is a Magic Number: The Revival of Tripartite Negotiation 
Although representatives of Turkey, Syria, and Iraq’s governments would not come 
together again to discuss water until 2007,243 civil society within the three states took 
advantage of the opportunity for water cooperation starting in 2005. That year, scholars, 
scientists, and professionals from Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and the United States established the 
Euphrates-Tigris Initiative for Cooperation (ETIC).244 Recognizing the limits of formal 
government negotiation, ETIC’s aim was to “provide opportunities to enhance the dialogue 
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and mutual understanding among the riparians of the Euphrates-Tigris System”245 through 
“voluntary, nonofficial, nonbinding, not for profit, and non-governmental” track two 
diplomacy.246 More recently, ETIC has put an emphasis on climate change, endeavoring to 
develop a database of agricultural, historical, hydrologic, and development information for 
use of the three riparian governments in their official negotiations.247 Though it is unclear 
what, if any, impact ETIC had upon official negotiations, the mere existence of such an 
institution is indicative of the warming climate for cooperation among the three riparian 
states. It also represented the first forum of water experts from all three countries to convene 
since the Joint Technical Committee meetings of the 1990s.  
During Syrian irrigation minister al-Atrash’s visit to Turkey’s GAP in 2001, he called 
for a revival of the tripartite Joint Technical Committee (JTC).248 Though it took six years, 
his wish came true in 2007. The JTC was reinstated after the Turkish Minister of the 
Environment and Forestry, Syrian Minister of Irrigation, and Iraqi Minister of Water 
Resources identified it as the most effective “cooperative framework to deal with regional 
water issues.”249 Between late 2007 and 2010, the JTC met several times to discuss river 
monitoring, joint training programs in irrigation management, information exchange for 
climate and drought data.250 The three states also agreed to build or repair river flow 
measuring gauges and Turkey acquiesced to increase downstream flow from 500m3/s to 
550m3/s during the dry season of 2009 in the face of worsening drought.251 At a 2008 JTC 
meeting, ministers from the three states decided to “establish a trilateral water institute 
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comprised of 15 water engineers from each country in order to conduct studies aimed at 
achieving efficiency in water use and management in the region.”252 Located at Atatürk Dam 
in Turkey and paid for by the Turkish government, the institute253 mapped the basin’s water 
resources and drafted recommendations for each state’s management of the Tigris and 
Euphrates waters in its borders.254 In 2009, the three states signed a memorandum of 
understanding, which “focused on the establishment of joint measurement stations on the 
Euphrates and Tigris rivers, exchange of meteorological information, observation of water 
amount that goes into Syria and Iraq every season, and evaluation of the impact of climate 
change on the two rivers.”255 This memorandum capped the late 2000s period of promising 
tripartite cooperation. 
High Level Strategic Cooperation Councils 
While the revitalization of the JTC and the establishment of the trilateral water 
institute were by far the most substantial illustrations of tripartite water cooperation in the 
2000s, 2008 and 2009 witnessed immense progress on bilateral fronts as well. Top diplomats 
in Turkey and Iraq established a High Level Strategic Cooperation Council (HSCC) in 2008 
to cover a broad range of issues between the two states, including, “encouraging cooperation 
in the field of water resources and agriculture to assist Iraq in meeting its agricultural needs 
and water requirements including irrigation by taking into account Turkey’s agricultural 
needs and water requirements to provide such assistance.”256 This goal of improved water 
cooperation was largely realized in mid-2009 when Turkey’s Ministry of Environment and 
Forestry and Iraq’s Ministry of Water Resources signed a memorandum of understanding 
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regarding national water use, development, and management, which also addressed potential 
effects of climate change.257  
Similarly, after Turkey’s establishment of an HSCC with Syria in early 2009, the two 
states also signed four water-related memorandums of understanding.258 The first permits 
Syria to construct a water pumping station on the Tigris, which Syria had previously 
underutilized, to withdraw 1.25km3 of water.259 One remarkable aspect of this memorandum 
is its clear indication of the continuing intention to reach a final agreement on allocation of 
the rivers. Though this particular memo does not achieve this allocation (or even that 
between Turkey and Syria alone on the Tigris), Article 6 begins, “Upon reaching a final 
allocation agreement of the waters of Tigris-Euphrates Rivers among Turkey, Syria, and 
Iraq…”260 thus illustrating the eventual intent to reach a more permanent agreement. The 
second and third memorandums outlined Turkey and Syria’s planned coordination in face of 
the worsening regional drought.261 Drought cooperation entailed extensive data, information, 
and experience exchange, hydrologic studies, joint training programs, implementation of 
monitoring and climate change mitigation measures, and rehabilitation of drought-resistant 
plant species.262 The potential to include Iraq in establishment of a joint hydrological and 
meteorological database is mentioned, but only “if deemed necessary by both parties.”263 The 
final, and perhaps most notable Syrian-Turkish memorandum is the memo “for the 
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construction of a joint dam on the Orontes River under the name ‘Friendship Dam,’”264 a 
name that is indicative of warming relations in and of itself. Syria and Turkey would 
collaborate on the construction, operation, and maintenance of the dam and its reservoir on 
the long-contested Orontes River.265 The dam marks the first large-scale joint river 
development project in the basin and provides a remarkable example of collaboration on 
water issues.  
  Beyond the more tangible examples of agreements and memorandums of 
understanding, the evolving rhetoric of leaders and high-profile ministers in the three riparian 
states best illustrates the new millennium’s changing tides. At a Middle East Water Forum in 
Jordan in 2008, Turkish Minister of Environment and Forestry, Veysel, Eroglu, said of 
Turkey’s use of the Tigris and Euphrates, “War will not erupt in the Middle East due to 
water…we do not perceive them as our rivers, and we wish to launch studies in line with 
interests of countries from which these rivers also flow.”266 This comes in contrast to the 
Turkish attitude during the second period, when a Turkish foreign minister suggested that 
downstream demands to halt dam construction were an “interference in Turkey’s national 
sovereignty”267 and then President Suleyman Demirel stated, “Turkey has the right to exploit 
Euphrates water, because 90 percent of the water comes from Turkey.”268 The new view 
clearly indicates a greater propensity on Turkey’s part to recognize alternate claims to the 
Tigris and Euphrates water sources and reflects the high politics, cooperative nature of their 
actions during this time period in contrast to the previous.  
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Hydro-Contention: Simmering Just Beneath the Surface 
  Despite kinder words along with actual progress in communication, discourse, and 
technical collaboration on the water issue, no formal treaty was signed among Turkey, Syria, 
and Iraq during this time period and the three states did not reach a trilateral agreement on 
water allocation. Turkey and Syria’s August 2001 Joint Communiqué on GAP and GOLD 
did not contain any provisions regarding changes in the amount of water Turkey would 
release as part of the agreement.269 The same can be said of all other agreements and 
memorandums of understanding (whether bilateral or trilateral) that took place during this 
time period. According to Kütük (2010), “Turkey continues to regard the Euphrates and 
Tigris as transboundary rivers while Syria and Iraq see them as international watercourses 
and demand an equal division of water.”270 As long as such rigid views of the river system 
remain, it will be very difficult for cooperation to get beyond the kind of technical progress 
made during this time period. 
This chapter has illustrated the oscillation of the Tigris-Euphrates basin’s 
hydropolitics over time. During the first period between the end of the First World War and 
the late 1950s/early 1960s, water was a low politics issue, managed as a technical, domestic 
policy concern, and subordinate to the three infant states’ newly forming political 
relationships. When discussed or addressed in treaties delineating overall relations, water was 
a cooperative issue among the three states, reaching the level of positive interaction on the 
conflict-cooperation spectrum characterized by information exchange and meetings of 
technical experts and bureaucrats. During the second time period, between 1960 and the turn 
of the century in 2000, water rose to high politics, taking center stage on agendas of prime 
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ministers, presidents, and foreign ministers and dealt with in state negotiations amidst critical 
concerns of security and territorial integrity. In these years, water politics became conflictual, 
with the liquid resource the subject of negative interaction ranging from verbal threats and 
coercive politics to military mobilization and covert activities. In the third time period, 
beginning at the start of the 21st century and extending until 2011, water remained a high 
politics issue, regularly discussed among high-level officials from all three states and 
certainly a foreign policy priority. However, unlike the previous period, water politics were 
collaborative during these years and, although no final allocation treaty was signed, there 
were instances of all types of positive engagement on the conflict-cooperation spectrum 
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Chapter 3: Turkey, Syria, and Iraq’s Politicized Hydropolitics 
As the previous chapter evidenced, while Tigris-Euphrates hydropolitics have 
fluctuated between positive and negative interaction among the three riparian states over 
time, the basin has not experienced either extreme on the conflict—cooperation spectrum. 
This chapter examines the factors that have driven the oscillation in hydropolitics over time. I 
show how scarcity, both real and perceived, drove water from low to high politics, and 
illustrate how overarching diplomatic relations, the influence of external actors, economic 
ties, and ethnic and ideological similarities and differences have shaped hydropolitics.  
Low Politics and Cooperation in the Early Years 
 
Water was the subject of largely low politics, positive interaction during the first time 
period for two reasons: 1) the abundance of water (i.e. absence of both real and perceived 
scarcity) allowed water to remain primarily a technical issue; and 2) an internal focus in all 
three states kept their leaders focused on domestic issues, namely independence from 
colonial powers, organization of new governments, forging of national identities, and internal 
reform. The three states’ water cooperation was thus embedded within the establishment of 
basic bilateral relationships among the three new states and reflected the relatively peaceful 
tenor of the states’ political relationships during this time period. 
Overflowing Rivers and Low Politics 
 
 Plentiful water to fulfill the needs of all three states and minimal upstream river 
development kept water off the agendas of high level politicians and separate from traditional 
security concerns. Without the threat of impending shortages or deprivation, water was an 
issue of little concern for state leaders and negotiators preoccupied with other pressing post-
war political concerns. Under the climatic conditions of this period, the Tigris and Euphrates 
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contained more than adequate flow to meet the consumptive needs of all three states.271 
Between the breakup of the Ottoman Empire and the late 1950s, Turkey, the most water rich 
of the three states, was using less than three percent of the Tigris and Euphrates water it 
possessed, Syria just under ten percent, and Iraq around fifty percent.272 Dolatyar and Gray 
(2000) characterize the rivers as having a “marked surplus of water…until the 1970s.”273 It is 
thus clear that there was no “real” scarcity during this period that might concern leaders and 
high-level officials within the three states. 
Development of the upstream stretches of the Tigris and Euphrates in Turkey and 
Syria was also extremely minimal, thus also preventing any perception of water scarcity 
within the riparian states. Placing water management in the hands of medium level 
technocrats, advisors, and professionals, “the riparian countries were mainly concerned with 
water supply for urban and rural populations”274 during this period. Populations and 
economies were still relatively small, keeping demands for agriculture and electricity low275 
and therefore requiring only the creation of small water management and irrigation projects 
that had little impact on water quality or quantity and were often inefficient.276 According to 
Shapland (1997), the views from Ankara, Damascus, and Baghdad during this period 
maintained that “it was clear that there was more than enough [water] for all,”277 keeping 
water low on the political agendas of the three riparians.  
Iraq was the only state during the 1918-1960 time period that saw any substantial use 
of water for more than basic consumptive purposes. As much of the nation is comprised of 
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low-lying plains, Iraq faced a severe flooding problem. While Iraq was still under Ottoman 
rule in the early 1900s, British hydrological engineer William Wilcox (hired by the Ottomans 
to evaluate solutions to the flooding issue) recommended the construction of the al-Hindiya 
Barrage on the Euphrates, the Kut Barrage on the Tigris, the Habbaniya, Tharthar, and 
Naharavan irrigation projects, and what would become the Bekhme and Mosul Dams to 
address the flooding problems and reinvigorate the small-scale irrigation of ancient 
Mesopotamia.278 The development of these projects proceeded slowly while Iraq was 
occupied by the British and after Iraqi independence in 1932.  As the farthest downstream 
state on both rivers, these actions only affected domestic Iraq. Although they have provided 
the grounds upon which Iraq has claimed “historical rights” to the use of the basin since then, 
Iraq’s hydro development projects for flood control and small-scale irrigation during this 
time period were of very little concern to the two upstream powers, as they had no impact on 
the water supply faced in Turkey and Syria. Thus, despite the presence of some hydro-
development, the fact that this development took place in the state farthest downstream on 
both rivers—and that no state faced the constraints of either real or perceived scarcity—water 
was not a primary issue in the states’ relations. With water a low politics concern, there was 
“no exigency during that period in devising a regime framework for better management and 
utilization of the waters in the basin”279 or in disputing river usage. 
Looking Inwards 
The cooperative water politics of this time period can largely be attributed to the 
inward focus of the three countries during their early years. Throughout this era, the three 
regimes were preoccupied with developing domestic economies and forming bureaucracies 
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and basic governance institutions. Upon independence in 1932, Iraq faced numerous 
problems left over from Ottoman and British rule. The state spent the first several years of 
independence stabilizing its political system, quelling tribal fighting, and attempting to meet 
the demands of local citizens for order, infrastructure, and food.280 Similarly, after it became 
an independent nation at the end of WWI, Turkey turned inward to heal the land of its 
wounds, and Atatürk focused on goals of rapidly consolidating, developing, and reforming 
the Turkish state.281 After independence in 1941, Syria was left with little to no political 
structure. The nation thus focused domestically to construct its state institutions282 and build 
a cohesive nation free from French influence.  
While this time period did see the beginnings of plans for the larger scale hydro-
development that would come to characterize the years between 1960 and 2000, these plans 
reflected the three states’ internal focus. The states kept their plans for water management 
and development to themselves,283 and, preoccupied as they were facing the internal 
challenges of nationalist movements, bureaucracy formation, and power transitions from 
colonials to national governments, they were not overly concerned about water plans being 
made elsewhere. According to Kilbaroglu (2013), the three states’ burgeoning “national 
management and allocation policies were like ‘black boxes,’”284 reflecting both the domestic 
focus of state governments, and also indicating that the riparians’ future water demands were 
not discussed during treaty negotiations.285 While the treaty clauses pertaining to water 
clearly acknowledge the potential for future challenges of water allocation, the fact that 
development schemes were not yet finished or shared during negotiations both made water 
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agreements basic and positive and allowed water to be treated as just another technical issue 
to be dealt with amidst state formation.  
This is reflected in Turkey and Syria’s early hydro-development planning, which was 
at this time managed by the relevant bureaucratic organs in each state (the Ministry of 
Energy and Natural Resources in Turkey286 and the Ministry of Public Works and the 
Ministry of the Euphrates Dam in Syria287). In 1936, Turkey established the “Administration 
for Electricity Studies” to investigate the potential of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers for 
hydroelectric production.288 Extensive surveys and studies of the geologic and hydrologic 
features of the basins were completed, resulting in plans for development projects along the 
Twin Rivers and the creation of the State Hydraulic Works (DSI) in 1953 to manage water 
development.289 However, despite “the Euphrates and Tigris rivers attract[ing] the attention 
of planners in the early years of the Turkish Republic...the remoteness of the region and the 
more pressing matters facing the young nation prevented action at that time.”290  
Hydro-planning began as early as the 1920s in Syria, when the French recommended 
the construction of a barrage on the Euphrates near Syria’s border with Turkey.291 However 
the plan was not carried out then, nor upon reinvestigation after Syria gained independence in 
1946.292 In the early 1950s, Syria saw some small-scale installation of pumps for irrigation, 
but it was not until the 1960s that more widespread water development began in both Syria 
and Turkey.293 The fact that the domestic projects during this first period both remained in 
the planning phase and that the full extent of their future water demand was not yet known 
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among the three riparians contributed to the perception of water abundance and facilitated 
this period’s cooperative hydro-politics. Water negotiations’ place embedded within the 
larger peace process and the establishment of basic diplomatic and economic relations also 
illustrates how water politics followed the tenor of the three states’ broader political 
relationships during this period. 
The Conflictual High Politics of Century’s End 
 
Water’s movement from the low politics of the first period to high politics in the 
second was driven by the riparian states’ mutual realizations that the aggregate water demand 
of the their unilateral development projects, all of which were deeply tied to national pride 
and regime legitimacy in their respective states, exceeded the Twin Rivers’ supply. This 
perceived scarcity, which threatened the potential for each state to develop and maintain 
control of their diverse populations, made water a high politics issue. The conflictual water 
politics of the time followed overarching trends of hostility among the three riparian states. 
The specific factors that drove negative hydro-interactions in the second time period were: 
the Hatay territorial dispute between Syria and Turkey, Cold War proxy politics, Alawi and 
Sunni Ba’ath ideological differences and rivalries in Syria and Iraq, and Kurdish questions in 
Turkey. With water in the arena of high politics, the existing political divides based on the 
above factors made cooperative, positive hydro-interaction impossible. In this respect, water 
once again followed politics in Tigris-Euphrates riparian relations. 
Developing Dispute: Scarcity and the Politics of Development 
 While hydro-development projects were in their planning phases up until the 1950s, 
the 1960s marked the beginning of their implementation and the first communication of the 
plans’ water demands among riparians. It was during the 1960s JTC negotiations that the full 
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extent of the three riparians’ competing claims to the rivers emerged.294 When the three 
riparians brought forward their development projects’ water demands and found them to 
outstrip river supply by more than 50 percent,295 water became, for the first time in the 
Tigris-Euphrates basin, a scarce resource. With aggregate demand set to exceed supply, the 
states were transformed from neighbors into competitors. The arrival of this perceived 
scarcity—and attendant to it, the possibility of real scarcity down the line—created the 
potential for conflict and dispute based on competing river claims, thus making water a 
possible security concern and catapulting it into high politics.  
The implication of this newly created scarcity was that one or more state(s) were 
going to have to scale back their projects or alter their designs to make them less water 
intensive. Because of intimate linkages between the riparian states’ massive hydro-
development projects and national pride, regime legitimacy, and economic success, the threat 
that each state’s project posed to those of the other states went beyond the risk of incomplete 
dams. In Turkey, “GAP [w]as a matter of national pride,” inspiring a kind of “obsessive 
interest in it by some politicians, such as Turgut Özal and Suleyman Demirel.”296 With the 
original plans laid out by the revered father of modern Turkey himself297 and designed to 
unite the state’s ethnic groups by “turn[ing] Kurds into Turks,”298 GAP was inextricably 
linked to Turkish national identity. In fact, each dam was inscribed with the motto of Turkish 
nationalism (originally spoken by Atatürk himself), “Ne mutlu Türküm diyene,” meaning 
“Happy is whoever says ‘I am a Turk.’”299 Similarly, in both Syria and Iraq, the “concept of 
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Arab food security…dominated…strategic thinking during the 1980s.” 300 The economic 
promise of hydro-development projects was an important source of legitimacy for the 
regimes in both downstream states. In Syria, top officials asserted that “the Syrian Euphrates 
Project is Syria’s future,”301 and both states’ ruling Ba’ath parties “placed…emphasis on the 
development of rural areas and the organization of peasants as a political power base.”302 As 
the three riparians’ Tigris and Euphrates development projects were tied to state unity and 
regime survival, the moment that the extent of the three projects’ water demands were known 
by all parties, each state’s project thus became a threat to not only the others’ development 
plans but the very foundations of their states. In the words of Turkey’s President Suleyman 
Demirel: “Neither Syria nor Iraq can lay claim to Turkey's rivers any more than Ankara 
could claim their oil. This is a matter of sovereignty. We have a right to do anything we like. 
The water resources are Turkey's, the oil resources are theirs. We don't say we share their oil 
resources, and they can't say they share our water resources.”303 Such sentiments were 
echoed and compounded in downstream states Syria and Iraq, where Turkey’s development 
projects not only made their own development more challenging, but also gave Turkey a 
“water weapon.” As such, water politics became high politics.  
Water and Political Conflict in JTC Negotiations 
Hatay Territorial Dispute 
Despite the importance of water to all three regimes, otherwise politically strained 
relationships drove negative hydropolitical interactions. Between Turkey and Syria, the 
Hatay territorial dispute colored relations enough to prevent productive water cooperation. In 
1939, France ceded the Syrian territory of Hatay (also known as Alexandretta or Iskenderun) 
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to Turkey in exchange for Turkey’s entrance of the Second World War on the side of the 
Allies.304 However, since independence, Syria refused to acknowledge the transfer of this 
piece of territory and continued to show Hatay as a part of its own territory on Syrian 
maps.305 At the same time, Turkey also claimed the region, and its people, as her own. The 
Hatay territorial dispute became linked to Tigris-Euphrates water politics amidst disputes 
over the Orontes River. The Orontes River runs from Syria into the Hatay province. During 
the 1940s and 1950s, Syria, treating Hatay as her own, built small dams on the upper reaches 
of the Orontes without consulting Turkey.306 When Turkish farmers claimed to be facing 
water shortages in the early 1960s, Turkey attempted to link negotiations over the Orontes 
with those for the Euphrates.307 Syria refused, continuing to ignore Turkey’s codified claim 
to the province.308 Syria’s unwillingness to budge on the Hatay issue shaped Turkey’s 
alacrity to negotiate and make concessions during the tripartite 1960s negotiations about the 
Tigris-Euphrates. According to Barkey (1996), “Turkey’s insensitivity to downstream needs 
and concerns is a by-product of traditionally bitter relations between the two states.”309 Thus, 
the lack of cooperation on the issue of Tigris-Euphrates water during this period can be 
partially attributed to the bilateral animosities stemming from Turkey and Syria’s decades-
festering Hatay territorial dispute. 
Cold War Proxy Politics 
 The negative hydro-interaction among the three riparian states during this second 
time period was also a result of conflictual predispositions based on historical ethnic 
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animosities and Cold War political alignments. Even prior to the Second World War, Turkey 
began to face west. Atatürk’s secular, modernizing reforms endeavored to “bring Turkey 
closer culturally and politically to Europe.”310 Atatürk’s reforms, which emphasized 
“Turkification” reflected the anti-Arab sentiments of the early 20th century Young Turk 
movement in Turkey. According to Barkey (1996), “the extremist Turkification policies of 
the Young Turks, in the form of harsh suppression of Arab language and culture, resulted in 
an angry backlash that resonates even today in Turkey’s relations with the Arab world.”311 
The Cold War only served to deepen these existing divides between Turkey and her Arab 
neighbors downstream. In response to Soviet attempts to claim eastern Turkish territory and 
waters following the Second World War,312 Turkey joined the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) in 1952,313 finalizing “a strategic portion of the long-term plan to join 
Europe and the West.”314  
While Turkey was turned toward the West, Syria and Iraq were both facing East. In 
1955, Syria opted to join a Soviet pact in return for $200 million in aid,315 and both Syria and 
Iraq received Soviet assistance in hydro-development planning and construction.316 These 
alliances not only served to deepen the East-West divide that existed along Syria and Iraq’s 
northern borders with Turkey, but linked the larger geopolitical conflict to Tigris-Euphrates 
hydropolitics. According to Dolatyar and Gray (2000), in the more conflictual water relations 
of this time period, “what was critical was the East-West competition which came to graft 
itself on the internal rivalries between the countries in the region. It was specifically in the 
‘East-West context’ that the development of the Euphrates by the three riparian countries 
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gained considerable strategic significance.”317 It was thus the conflictual political climate of 
the Cold War that colored Turkey, Syria, and Iraq’s water engagement during the second 
period and hamstrung each state’s willingness to negotiate and compromise on water during 
the negotiations that did take place. In this way, water relations followed political relations. 
In the words of Allan (2002), the more conflictual Tigris-Euphrates politics in the latter half 
of the 20th century were “examples of the international allocation and management of water 
in the region being subordinate to the other priorities of international relations.”318 
Political Rivalry and the 1975 Euphrates Crisis 
Water’s mercy to the ebb and flow of the riparian states wider diplomatic relations 
was again illustrated in the 1975 crisis between Iraq and Syria. While upon first look, Syria 
and Iraq’s mutual threat of armed action appears to stem from Iraq’s animosity resulting from 
water shortages after the filling of Syria’s Tabqa Dam reservoir, two factors indicate 
otherwise. First, it is highly unlikely that the two states would have been so quick to mobilize 
troops to their shared border if it was not for their regimes’ fierce, pre-existing rivalry and 
ideological differences; and second, had the dispute truly centered on water, Iraq would 
likely have placed equal blame on Turkey (whose filling of the Keban Dam reservoir at the 
same time as Syria’s Tabqa contributed to the shortages Iraq experienced).  
At the end of the First World War, the initial, relatively arbitrary, state divisions paid 
little attention to ethnic or religious lines, creating the potential for internal ethnic or sectoral 
conflict in the newly formed states. The institutionalization of these differences in Syrian and 
Iraqi politics after independence pitted these two states against each other. In 1947, the 
Syrian Ba’ath party was elected, and in 1954, a parallel Ba’athist movement arose in Iraq,319 
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marking the beginning of an era in which, “the two Ba’ath regimes [were] in competition for 
hegemony in the Arab world.”320 The Syrian Ba’ath party was Alawi (a Shia sect with ties to 
the Shia minority in Iraq) and the Iraqi Ba’ath was Sunni.321 This religious divide, 
competition to be the principal ideological voice in the Arab nationalist movements of the 
region, and personal hatreds between the two Ba’athist regime leaders322 colored the water 
tensions between these two states. According to Scheumann (2003), “The threat of war in the 
mid-1970s was much more the result of political rivalries between the Syrian and Iraqi 
branches of the Ba’ath Party and their competition over regional strength and authority than 
struggles over water.”323  
This was reflected in Syrian and Iraqi propaganda during the 1975 Euphrates crisis. 
The two regime’s public acknowledgements of the water issue almost exclusively appeared 
alongside rhetoric attacking the other’s “Arab legitimacy.”324 According to Kienle (1990), 
Iraq “made it clear on several occasions that…it did not regard the [Euphrates] problem as 
‘technical’ but as ‘political’, stemming from the two sides’ controversy over the defense of 
Arab rights and interests.”325 A high ranking political figure of the Iraqi Ba’ath Regional 
Command, Na’im Haddad, stated during the 1975 crisis,  
Today…certain regimes, particularly the Syrian regime…cut off water from our masses…But we will 
be victorious as we have been before. The masses of our Arab people in Syria will discover this 
criminal design, which is neither new to us nor unexpected. The same Syrian regime adopted a 
negative policy when the revolution in Iraq nationalized the monopolist oil companies and even 
requested an increase in revenue from the oil flow.326  
 
This statement illustrates the inseparability of Iraq and Syria’s water dispute from the two 
states’ political rivalry. Tigris-Euphrates politics’ tendency to follow Iraq and Syria’s larger 
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Ba’athist ideological and political antagonism is further evidenced by 1) the failure of this 
official, and the Iraqi regime overall, to place any blame on Turkey for Iraq’s water 
challenges;327 and 2) the fact that the Syrian and Iraqi regimes briefly united against Turkey 
to oppose GAP in 1989, only after tempers between the two Ba’athist regimes had finally 
cooled.328 Thus, while water certainly exacerbated existing tensions between Iraq and Syria 
during the second time period, it was the overarching political climate of the times that 
dictated the negative tenor of hydropolitics rather than vice versa. 
Issue Linkage: Kurdish Militants and Euphrates Waters 
During the last 20 years of the second time period (1980-2000), the linkage of the 
water issue to that of PKK militancy in Turkey largely accounts for the contentious water 
politics between Syria and Turkey. When the Turkish state was first formed at the heart of 
the deceased Ottoman Empire, it came to contain coastal areas along the Mediterranean and 
Black Sea (populated largely by ethnic Turks) and Anatolia: the mountainous, water-rich 
region to the East where most considered themselves ethnically Kurdish. While these ethnic 
differences had been nearly invisible under Ottoman rule—when demographic 
differentiations were made on the basis of religion, rather than ethnicity329—Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk’s secularizing reforms after the First World War complimented a new attitude toward 
ethnic identity. The 1924 constitution clearly articulated that the concepts of “citizen” and 
“Turk” were one and the same, meaning for Kurds that the modern republic’s new 
citizenship rights came “at the expense of denying their own ethnic identity.”330 Unable to 
speak their own language and severely culturally repressed over the first three quarters of the 
20th century, a budding Kurdish nationalism, with ties to Kurdish populations across the 
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border in Syria and in northern Iraq, grew in Turkey’s southeast. In 1984, a branch of the 
Kurdish nationalist movement, the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) began fighting a guerilla 
campaign against the Turkish government in an attempt to carve a Kurdish state out of 
Southeastern Anatolia.331 The resulting pseudo-civil war between PKK militants and 
government forces would come to claim more than 40,000 lives over the next 20 years.332  
Given the extraordinary violence that resulted from Kurdish separatism in Turkey and 
the threat it posed to the very foundations of Turkish national identity and territorial integrity, 
this issue came to inhabit center stage in both Turkey’s domestic policy and regional 
relations. Water policy is no exception. The linkage between the PKK issue and water was 
originally a domestic phenomenon—a Turkish attempt to use hydro-development to 
enfranchise its discontented Kurdish population. Given that “the Kurdish question is arguably 
the most serious internal problem in the Turkish republic’s…history,”333 and identifying 
economic underdevelopment as a principal factor in the political and social unrest that had 
characterized Turkey’s Kurdish region throughout the late 20th century, Turkey’s 
Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP), was conceived as a tool to improve regional stability, 
discourage separatism, and counter the draw of the PKK.334 However, both GAP and the 
PKK issue had implications beyond Turkey’s borders. According to Barkey (1996) and 
James and Özdamar (2009), “Turkey’s relations with its neighbors [were] driven by the 
exigencies of the [PKK] rebellion”335 and “internal relations between Turkish-Kurds and the 
national government in Ankara…had direct influence on the relationship between Turkey 
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and Syria.”336 Thus, given the gravity of the PKK predicament at home and the use of hydro-
development with downstream implications to combat it, Turkey’s decisions in Tigris-
Euphrates negotiations were influenced by concerns for the Kurdish issue within its borders. 
The importance of GAP to containing the PKK made Turkey less willing to compromise or 
scale back its project in negotiations with Syria and Iraq.  
The PKK issue was also linked to Tigris-Euphrates riparian political dynamics as part 
of Turkish efforts to externalize the PKK threat and thereby mobilize Turkish nationalism 
against it. According to Brahma (2013), “The GAP case illustrates how water disputes may 
come in ‘handy to politicians in personifying real or perceived outside threats in the domestic 
context and in this way serve to unite the society against ‘foreign enemies’ and mobilize 
support for the government.’”337 However, this linkage between the dispute over the 
Euphrates and Turkey’s domestic Kurdish question provided Syria and Iraq with an 
opportunity in their attempts to gain leverage against Turkey’s growing military, economic, 
and hydro-hegemony that further entwined the two issues. Syria, which had been 
intermittently supporting militants inside Turkey since the 1970s,338 recognized the 
additional control GAP would give Turkey over her water resources, and by extension her 
people, and thus had “an interest in aiding [the PKK] movement because one of the targets of 
the guerilla group [was] the GAP.”339 Thus, “Damascus continued to pursue a policy which 
had been enforced since the early 1970s and which had acquired greater importance because 
of the Euphrates dispute. It consisted of supporting left-wing Turkish extremists, Kurdish 
secessionists, and Armenian militants, but refusing to admit it.”340 Though Iraq had less of a 
history of doing so, Saddam Hussein’s regime is rumored to have also supported the PKK’s 
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activities in Turkey for a time during the Atatürk Dam crisis.341 Thus, Syrian and Iraqi efforts 
to hamper full Turkish control of their water resources by supporting PKK militants within 
Turkey compounded the linkage of the PKK issue to the water issue, and, by bringing water 
politics intimately near Turkey’s primary security threat, contributed to the more conflictual 
nature of water politics during the time that the two issues were linked.  
While downstream riparian’s use of the PKK card as leverage to guarantee Tigris and 
Euphrates flow may initially appear to be an example of water leading politics (i.e. 
downstream states choosing to take political steps because of water concerns), there are two 
factors that indicate otherwise. First, the water problem was only one among many festering 
political disputes between Turkey and her downstream neighbors. Iraq and Syria’s support 
for the PKK was related to an overarching political goal of offsetting Turkey’s growing 
regional hegemony overall, and not only (or even primarily) hydro-hegemony. According to 
Barkey (1996), “The use of the PKK card against Turkey by its neighbors with varying 
degrees of intensity is a direct result of their need to balance Turkey’s potential threat to 
them.” 342 While water problems were a piece of this, Syria and Iraq were “also motivated, 
respectively, by irredentist claims over Alexandretta or by desire for revenge for Turkey’s 
role during the Gulf Conflict.” 343 In this case, water was inseparable from other political 
grievances that collectively provided adequate motivation for Syria and, to a lesser extent, 
Iraq, to support the PKK. Secondly, as will be discussed in the following section, the rapid 
warming of water relations directly following the resolution of the PKK issue between Syria 
and Turkey indicates that water relations were once again at the mercy of other political 
disputes. Given Syria’s additional motivations for supporting the PKK beyond simply water 
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concerns, it is unlikely that the resolution of the water issue would have had similar 
ameliorating impacts on the PKK issue. Thus, while water was a high politics, priority issue 
for the riparian states during this time period, state actions were not motivated exclusively or 
even primarily by water concerns. Rather, water once again played into the intricacies of the 
states’ relationships overall and water politics were guided by the tenor of a broad variety of 
often unrelated political and social concerns.  
High Fives and High Hydropolitics 
 
During the third time period, water remained in the realm of high politics due to both 
continued unilateral water project development on the Twin Rivers (and thus a persistence of 
perceived scarcity among riparians) and the onset of real scarcity with an extended drought in 
Mesopotamia. Despite the first widespread shortages the basin has experienced since ancient 
times,344 Turkey, Syria, and Iraq’s water politics took on a remarkably cooperative character 
during this time period, following several overarching political trends: 1) resolution of 
historic disputes between Turkey and Syria, including the Hatay territorial disagreement and 
the PKK issue; 2) growing EU-influence in Turkey, which triggered reorientations in both 
Turkey’s overall foreign policy towards its neighbors and its water policy; and 3) changes in 
leadership, trade dynamics, and views of the Kurds in all three states near the turn of the 
century.  
The High Politics of Drought 
  
 Perceived scarcity persisted into this period because, even during a time of overall 
water collaboration, none of the three states was willing to scale back its development 
projects.345 In spite of several financial stumbling blocks, Turkey has continued its 
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construction of Ilisu Dam on the Tigris,346 much to Iraq’s displeasure. According to Iraq, the 
dam would give Turkey the ability to decrease flow of the Tigris by 47 percent,347 damaging 
Iraqi agriculture and the economy. Baghdad long protested the construction of Ilisu348 and 
Iraqi author, Sami Hasan, was widely quoted for his inflammatory statements towards 
Turkey and Syria’s continued dam construction.349 And yet, Iraq’s projects went on as well. 
Under a newly appointed minister of water resources in 2004, Iraq had its own laundry list of 
proposed hydro-development projects,350 including the massive Bakhmah, or “Dream” Dam 
capable of restraining 11 billion square meters of water and producing 1500MW of 
electricity.351 Like Turkey’s, Iraq’s projects were not void of critics. Gun Kut, water expert at 
Istanbul’s Bogazici University, stated in response to Syria and Iraq’s continued allegation 
that Turkish dam projects leave too little water for downstream, “Quit wasting the water and 
there will be enough for everybody.”352 The ongoing hydro-development and continuing 
condemnation in each state of others’ projects illustrates the persistence of perceived scarcity 
in the basin. As projects continue, each state perceives the basin as becoming scarcer and 
unable to meet the demand of all riparians. The fact that dam construction and water project 
efficiency remained a key hydropolitical concern among riparians further exemplifies how 
the perception of potential scarcity has helped to keep water a high politics issue. 
The arrival of real scarcity during the latter half of the third time period also 
contributed to water’s sustained place in high politics. In the six years between 2003 and 
2009, the Tigris-Euphrates basin lost 117 million acre-feet of stored freshwater, representing 
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the second fastest loss of water in a six year period of anywhere on the planet.353 Beginning 
in 2006, summer rains failed to arrive four years in a row in the basin,354 leading NOAA to 
release a study suggesting that, “the magnitude and frequency of the drying that has occurred 
is too great to be explained by natural variability alone” and linking Fertile Crescent drought 
to human-induced climate change.355 All three Tigris-Euphrates riparians were impacted by 
regional scarcity. In Turkey, farmland dried up in the country’s Southeast356 and Istanbul and 
Ankara instituted rationing programs in 2007 when drought brought reservoirs to five percent 
capacity.357 Syria’s harvest in 2008 was 38 percent lower than prior to the drought,358 and by 
2010, 160 villages had been abandoned and 800,000 citizens lost their livelihoods due to 
drought.359 In Iraq, harvests fell by 51 percent,360 dust storms engulfed the country’s north,361 
and two million people in the south faced drinking water and electricity shortages.362 Under 
such conditions, with water refugees multiplying rapidly and urban dwellers demanding 
improved supply, water remained high on both the domestic and foreign policy agendas of all 
three states’ top officials.  
Despite that physical conditions were ripe for water competition and conflict, high 
water politics took on a cooperative nature during this period. In the words of Turkish 
Foreign Minister Ahment Davutoğlu in a 2009 meeting with Iraqi Foreign Minister Hosyhar 
Zebari, “We know the situation is worsening in Iraq [and Syria] due to drought…we 
understand the difficulties of the farmers in Basra. Their difficulties are our difficulties. Their 
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future is our future. The expectations of the farmers in Iraq and Syria are equally important 
for us.”363 Though Turkey and Syria repeatedly came close to war during the final 40 years 
of the 20th century, the resolution of several issues that provided the sources of these disputes 
during the second time period helps to explain the rapid improvement in riparian relations 
and the tenor of the two states’ water politics during the third time period. 
Healing Old Wounds in Turkey and Syria 
Delinking Water from Syrian Support for PKK Militancy 
After Turkey massed 10,000 troops along its mutual border with Syria in 1998, leaders of 
the two states met in Adana, Turkey and signed the Adana Agreement. 364 With the Adana 
Agreement, “Syria for the first time acknowledged that the PKK was a terrorist organization” 
and agreed to “(1) expel PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan from Syria…(2) arrest PKK militants 
active in Syria and uproot the PKK camps there; (3) cease providing weapons and logistical 
and financial support to the PKK and forbid it to use Syrian soil…(4) extend cooperation 
with Turkey against the PKK well into the future.” 365 It was less than a year after the Syrians 
made good on these promises in 1999 that Turkey increased Euphrates flow into Syria. 
Though Turkish officials cited technical reasons behind their choice—the need to reduce 
pressure on dams in case of earthquakes—it is far more likely that the Syrian expulsion of 
Öcalan, and the de-linking of the PKK and water issues between Turkey and Syria that 
occurred as a result of the Adana Agreement, was the real reasoning behind Turkey’s good 
water will.366 The warming water relations that resulted from the resolution of the PKK issue 
at the end of the 20th century led Dohrmann and Hatem (2014) to assert, as I do, that “the 
water issue cannot be identified as the leading source of tension and conflict between Turkey 
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and Syria.”367 Given the critical importance of the PKK issue to Turkish domestic and 
foreign policy, it comes as little surprise that resolution of this long-standing tension between 
Turkey and Syria improved not only their overall political relations going into the 21st 
century, but also prompted a softening of Turkey’s stance on the water issue and the 
beginning of more positive hydro-interactions.  
Settlement of the Hatay Dispute 
Following trade negotiations between Turkish and Syrian leadership in late 2008, “the 
Syrian government revised its official maps so as to remove the district around Iskandarun 
from Syrian territory,”368 effectively acknowledging Hatay as a part of Turkey. Resolution of 
this long-standing dispute between the two states directly influenced collaboration on the 
water issue with their agreement to construct the Friendship Dam, the two states’ inaugural 
shared water project. According to Kütük (2010), Syria’s “agreement to build a dam jointly 
on the Orontes River on the border between Hatay and Syria in 2010 [was] an official seal on 
Syria’s acceptance of Hatay as a part of Turkey.”369 If Syria still considered Hatay as her 
own, there would be no “joint” water project, as the Friendship Dam would be in Syrian 
territory alone. The fact that the project was funded and managed by both states in tandem 
with one another not only illustrates Syrian acknowledgement of Hatay as Turkish territory 
in practice, but also was made possible only through the resolution of this territorial dispute. 
Here, warming water relations and high levels of cooperation arrived alongside solutions to 
other, age-old political problems between the two states that had contributed to conflictual 
hydropolitics in the past. When the political problems that had made both overall relations 
and hydropolitics divisive were resolved, water politics improved along with the states’ 
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thawing attitudes. This again provides an example of water politics following larger political 
relations in the Tigris-Euphrates Basin. 
The EU in Turkey 
Although evolving dynamics in all three states contributed to the more positive 
riparian interactions of the third time period, as the farthest upstream state, Turkey’s 
changing attitudes toward its downstream neighbors (largely as a result of EU influence) 
played an important role in the betterment of diplomatic relations and hydro-engagement 
during the third time period. While Turkey has been tying itself closer to Europe since 
1959,370 it was officially granted candidate status for membership to the European Union 
(EU) at the Helsinki Summit in 1999.371 Turkey thus entered the 21st century with a new 
focus on meeting requirements for EU membership. This has taken two forms: 1) taking on a 
role in the Middle East that, to a certain extent, serves European foreign policy needs; and 2) 
implementing domestic reforms in issue areas extending from economic policy to human 
rights in an effort to align Turkish policy with that of Europe.372 With regard to the former, 
Turkey has, since the turn of the century, recognized that its greatest source of value to 
Europe and much of the West comes from its ability to connect to and represent its (often 
more troublesome) Middle Eastern neighbors. In other words, in the early 2000s, the Turkish 
government could see that “the acceptance of Turkey’s placement in the West will be more 
likely through the strengthening of Turkey’s links to the east.”373 Turkey thus enacted its 
“zero problems with neighbors” policy374 in the early 2000s, which endeavored to improve 
Turkish relations with Syria, Iraq, and Iran with goals of both increasing Turkey’s regional 
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influence and making it an even more appealing ally to Europe. Under the auspices of the 
“zero problems” policy, which represented an “appropriation of EU norms and principles in 
regional politics,”375 Turkey took on a “pre-emptive approach” to “eliminate all the problems 
from her relations with her neighbors or at least minimize them as much as possible.”376 
Water, as a “problem” among Turkey and her downstream neighbors, was not excluded from 
this reorientation in Turkish foreign policy and hydropolitics thus became more cooperative 
amidst improving relations overall. The “zero problems with neighbors” policy helps to 
explain Turkey’s more active efforts to communicate and collaborate bilaterally with both 
downstream neighbors on water issues during this time period, and, because of Turkey’s 
preeminent place as hydro-hegemon of the basin as a whole, contributed to the more positive, 
collaborative trilateral hydro-interactions in this period. 
Turkey’s aspirations to join the EU also had a more direct, explicit impact on her 
domestic and foreign water policy. As a potential EU member state, Turkey is responsible for 
implementing the European Union Water Framework Directive (WFD).377 While the WFD 
presents member states with a wide variety of responsibilities and initiatives ranging from 
reducing pollution in urban wastewater to implementing accurate water pricing, at the heart 
of the WFD is the requirement of water management on the scale of entire river basins, rather 
than individual states.378 In other words, full implementation of the EU WFD mandates, “the 
integration of industrial, agricultural, rural development, nature conservation and forestry 
programmes at the river basin scale and, in many cases, transboundary collaboration.”379 In 
the case of water bodies “that extend beyond the territory of the EU, the WFD obliges 
Member states to endeavor to establish appropriate coordination with non-member states 
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with a view to achieving the objectives of the Directive.”380 As an EU candidate state, 
Turkey began implementation of WFD when it entered into force in October of 2000,381 and 
thus, starting in that year, was “under an obligation to seek cooperative arrangements with 
Iraq and Syria with the aim of achieving good…status as defined in the EU WFD.”382 Thus, 
though the Turkish government has not released statements explicitly linking its increasingly 
collaborative attitude toward its downstream neighbors to its requirements to fulfill the WFD, 
it is nearly indisputable that Turkey’s need to work towards basin wide river management of 
the Tigris and Euphrates (per EU directive) contributed to the more cooperative hydropolitics 
that began at the turn of the century. With EU membership one of the Turkish 
administration’s top priorities in the 21st century, Turkey’s softened stance with regard to the 
Tigris and Euphrates and the state’s greater willingness to make concessions to, and 
collaborate with, Syria and Iraq on the water issue was influenced by the mandates of the EU 
WFD. 
Secondary Factors in a Warming Political Climate: New Leaders, Kurds, and Trade 
Beyond the resolution of long-standing disputes and EU influence in Turkey, new 
leadership in Turkey and Syria also played an important role in improving relations. 
Economic downturn and the US-led war in Iraq changed the regional dynamic considerably, 
also creating opportunities for newly-forged alliances and new economic ties in the power 
vacuum arising in Iraq after Saddam Hussein’s fall. Under these overarching political and 
economic conditions, the three states forged newly cooperative relationships based upon 
personal affinities among leaders, opportunities for trade and economic growth, and changes 
in each regimes’ relationship with its respective Kurdish population. Although rarely 
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explicitly related to water, bilateral cooperation on all sides of the Tigris-Euphrates triangle 
built up trust and a positive climate among the three states’ leadership, thus contributing to 
the improving hydro-political relationships during the third time period.  
Turkey and Syria 
 Between Turkey and Syria, the progress made on the Hatay, PKK, and water issues 
was broadly motivated by changes in leadership in both states. Hafiz al-Assad, who took 
power in Syria in 1970 and whose “crude interest in national and regime security”383 
contributed to strained relations with the Turkish regime throughout the latter half of the 20th 
century, passed away in 2000. According to Lawson (2013), “Improvements in relations 
between Syria and Turkey accelerated during the months surrounding the death of President 
Hafiz al-Assad.”384 Directly following Assad’s death, the two states revived a Joint 
Economic Commission and began working to fully normalize relations,385 a process in which 
the water project visits and river negotiations in the first years of the 21st century were part 
and parcel. In 2002, the election of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey 
completed the transformation of bilateral relations.386 Not only would the newly elected 
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdğoan, come to call Syria’s new leader, President Bashar al-
Assad his “brother,”387 but the two states would harmonize their economic policies. Under 
the economic component of Turkey’s “zero problems with neighbors” policy, Turkey and 
Syria signed a bilateral free trade agreement in 2007, and in 2009 removed visa requirements 
for travel between the two states.388 The fact that Syria also saw Turkey as an increasingly 
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powerful and important ally to have in the region389 undoubtedly contributed to her 
willingness to negotiate and collaborate on the water issue. In addition to such personal and 
economic ties between the two states—which certainly help to explain the increases in 
interaction and more positive water rhetoric between Turkey and Syria during the third time 
period—the two state’s newly harmonious Kurdish policies also played a role.  
It has been suggested that Turkey found itself less head to head with Iraq than with 
Syria over the water and PKK issues during the late 20th century because “Iraq and Turkey 
have a…common interest: the suppression of Kurdish dissidents in their frontier areas.”390 
This same common interest brought Turkey and Syria together during the third time period. 
After Kurdish areas of northern Iraq were granted some autonomy during the US occupation 
of Iraq,391 Syrian Kurds, “emboldened by the freedom they saw in Iraq,”392 erupted into 
revolt in Syria’s north.393 Syria, which rapidly quashed these Kurdish uprisings,394 got a taste 
of the challenge Turkey faced domestically in the PKK and found itself on common ground 
with Turkey in managing ever-bolder Kurdish populations at home. It is highly likely that, as 
the common Kurdish challenge mediated hostilities between Iraq and Turkey in previous 
years, it helped to foster cooperation—or at the very least common understanding—between 
Turkey and Syria during the 21st century. While it may not have directly impacted water 
relations between the two states, the intimate connections between water and the Kurdish 
issue suggests that a shared understanding of the Kurdish challenge, in addition to a strong 
personal relationship between heads of state and growing trade linkages, helped to create the 
environment for the 21st century’s more positive, cooperative water politics.  
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Iraq and Turkey 
While the creation of an autonomous region for Iraqi Kurds in the country’s north 
initially concerned Turkey, which feared the impact this Kurdish success would have on 
separatist Kurds within Turkey and their ability to operate out of a more independent 
northern Iraq,395 ultimately “Post-Saddam Iraq offered new opportunities for the AKP to 
seize…[which] would thrust Turkey into the wider region’s turbulent politics and make it a 
player in Iraq’s future.”396 Soon after the US-led invasion of Iraq, Turkey, which maintained 
goals of improving relations with its neighbors and “contribut[ing] to the emergence of a 
stable environment in the region”397 came to the understanding that its “relations with 
Baghdad now went through Erbil,”398 the capital of the autonomous Kurdish region in 
northern Iraq, controlled by the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG). With its sights set on 
becoming an “energy corridor” for Europe399 Turkey dared not risk its chances to secure Iraqi 
oil pipelines. Thus, despite its displeasure at Kurdish autonomy in northern Iraq, Turkey and 
Iraq under post-Saddam leadership reestablished the “free flow of traffic and revenues”400 
between the two states (which had been limited since the early 1990s) and implemented 
lucrative business and oil deals with the KRG.401 These critically important economic ties, 
which were intricately woven into Turkey’s goals of appealing to the European Union and 
extending its regional influence402 and provided Iraq with much needed revenues during 
unstable war years, helped keep water politics positive and cooperative. While water 
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remained high on both states’ agendas, neither side dared take a potentially disputable stance 
on the water issue at the expense of such important, profitable economic linkages.  
Syria and Iraq 
Similar changes in leadership and economic ties facilitated the more cooperative 
hydropolitics between Syria and Iraq during the third time period. After Bashar al-Assad took 
over his father’s place at Syria’s helm, “there were perceptible efforts to turn over a new leaf 
in his relations with Iraq under Saddam Hussein.”403 These efforts were manifested in the 
two states’ agreements to phase out duties and establish oil flow in 2001,404 and in their 
negotiations about the Euphrates during 2000.405 While the US invasion of Iraq changed the 
dynamic—bringing Syria’s remaining anti-Western sentiments into sharp relief close to 
home406—Syria kept up its efforts to maintain relations with Iraq, “welcome[ing] successive 
delegations of Iraqi notables as 2003 passed and [doing] their best to reestablish commercial 
and transportation links to post-war Iraq.”407 The economic ties between Syria and Iraq 
continued to grow throughout the first decade of the 21st century.408 While these ties alone 
are not enough to fully explain the improved water relations between these two states, they 
created critical interdependencies that helped facilitate the positive hydropolitical interactions 
of the time.    
Following Hydropolitics 
While it is clear from the above descriptions of 21st century changes that water 
relations followed the tenor of wider politics, this fact is perhaps best illustrated by the “19 
August Crisis” between Iraq and Syria. On August 19, 2009, a Shiite attack in Baghdad 
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killed 101 civilians and wounded 600 more.409 Iraq blamed Syria for the bombing and the 
issue shot to the “top of the political agenda.”410 Though Turkey, Iran, and the Arab League 
rushed to mediate so as to prevent the crisis from eroding the progress made in Syria and 
Iraq’s political, economic, and water relations during the new millennium, the two 
downstream Tigris-Euphrates states’ water relationship suffered.411 Syria and Iraq’s “crisis of 
confidence” blighted the water meeting that was to take place two weeks after the attack and 
hamstrung Turkey’s hopes for an integrated regional market to help ease energy and water 
tension.412 Though this brief crisis did not entirely, or even substantially, undermine water 
cooperation during the third period, it highlights both the peace’s fragility and the enduring 
link between the political atmosphere and the hydropolitical climate of the times. Despite the 
ample progress made during the first decade of the 21st century, water politics ultimately 
proved to still be susceptible to conflictual flares in other issue realms or relations overall.  
Patterns of Water Conflict and Cooperation 
 This study of the oscillation of Tigris-Euphrates hydropolitics synthesizes scholarship 
from the environmental security field focused on the question of resource cooperation and 
conflict. This research substantiates and further clarifies the conditions under which we can 
expect to see more cooperative or conflictual relationships among actors sharing a water 
resource. The preceding analysis of the ups and downs of water engagement in the Tigris-
Euphrates Basin demonstrates which aspects of the prevalent political, economic, and social 
circumstances in interstate relations tend to engender the more positive, cooperative 
hydropolitical outcomes seen in the first and third time periods, or encourage negative, 
conflictual hydropolitics, as in the second. Based on this analysis, it seems unlikely that any 
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transboundary water resource can be the subject of perfectly cooperative or entirely 
conflictual hydropolitics at all times. Rather, we can expect interaction to oscillate along the 
conflict-cooperation spectrum over time, only periodically reaching or remaining at either 
extreme.  
As water politics fluctuate between positive and negative engagement over time, it 
seems that the best determinant of the tenor of hydropolitical relations at any one moment is 
the current diplomatic climate. Throughout all three time periods, we see water “following” 
ties or divisions among the three riparian states. Whether the outcome was more 
collaborative or conflictual in each time period, hydropolitics improved when relations 
improved in general and worsened when they deteriorated. The most clear-cut example of 
this is issue linkage. In the Tigris-Euphrates case, hydropolitics tended to become conflictual 
when linked to other key issues of national security and sovereignty, such as the Kurdish 
issue and Hatay dispute between Turkey and Syria, but improved dramatically and quickly 
after such linked disputes were resolved. As such, it is clear that one of the most reliable 
means to achieve more cooperative hydropolitics is the resolution of issues to which they 
have been linked.  
The influence of an external actor can also be a very powerful force for engendering 
more cooperative hydropolitics, to the extent to which a third party prioritizes improved 
relations among riparian states. The opportunity for Turkey to gain membership to the EU 
had a remarkably positive impact on Tigris-Euphrates hydropolitics, as Turkey’s efforts to 
comply with the EU’s vision and requirements resulted in both a new concern for Turkey’s 
national image in its neighborhood and measures towards implementing EU-mandated basin-
wide river management. This EU influence ultimately drove a reorientation of Turkey’s 
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domestic and foreign water policy in the long-term that positively impacted basin-wide 
hydropolitics. We also see external actors having a positive impact on short-term dispute 
resolution, as the 1975 crisis between Iraq and Syria would likely have resulted in war if it 
were not for Soviet Union and Saudi Arabia mediation.413 However, when more cooperative 
politics are not a focus of an external actor influencing one or more states sharing a 
transboundary water body, third parties can have a negative impact. Such was seen when the 
Tigris-Euphrates riparians associated themselves with opposing superpowers during the Cold 
War and experienced conflictual hydropolitics while the international politics of these 
external actors influenced regional relations. 
Commitment from high-level officials and economic interdependencies also emerge 
as factors helpful for achieving cooperative hydropolitics. During the third period, water 
relations became markedly more positive in light of the fast friendship between Turkish 
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and their 
prioritization of the water issue. The existence of political will for cooperation in the 
upstream state especially encourages positive hydropolitics, as illustrated by the 
extraordinary impact of Turkey’s “zero problems with neighbors” policy in improving both 
political and water relations with its downstream neighbors. Growing trade linkages on all 
three sides of the Tigris-Euphrates triangle during the third, and to some extent also the first, 
period were similarly important in creating the climate for more cooperative hydropolitics at 
these times. 
The factor that emerges as most often espousing negative hydropolitical interactions 
is ethnic/ideological politics. When states or groups see themselves as divided along 
irreconcilable ethnic or ideological differences, or when such dynamics come into play in 
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water disputes, conflictual hydropolitics emerge or become more difficult to resolve. In the 
Tigris-Euphrates case, the Alawi and Sunni Ba’ath differences in Syria and Iraq provide 
evidence for such a conclusion, as does the Kurdish issue between Syria and Turkey and the 
echoes of Arab vs. Turk politics that remained in Turkey’s relationships with her downstream 
neighbors during the Cold War. That being said, when states find themselves on the same 
side of an ethnic dispute, positive hydropolitics can result, as seen in improvements of 
Turkey-Syria water relations in the third period as Syria came to share Turkey’s challenges in 
facing an uppity domestic Kurdish population.  
When connected to the water issue, nationalistic tendencies, concerns about 
sovereignty, and economic modernization can cause water relations take on a conflictual 
tone. As seen during the second period, when hydro-development projects become 
intertwined with national identity and regime legitimacy, states’ expressed displeasure at 
another’s water management can become a much broader affront and cause water politics to 
take on a competitive, nationalistic, and ultimately conflictual, tone. In the Tigris-Euphrates 
case, all three states saw their development projects for the Twin Rivers as key to 
maintaining control over their territory and uniting their populations, making them 
dramatically less willing to compromise in negotiations when it became clear that scale-
backs were necessary. 
Perhaps the most surprising finding of this case study is that regarding the role of 
scarcity. While scarcity is generally thought of as a factor that encourages conflictual water 
relations, the third period shows how a cooperative existing political context can override the 
potential competition of real and perceived scarcity to augment negative hydropolitics. In 
fact, this study illustrates that although scarcity creates the potential for conflict over water 
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resources by engendering competition (or at least the perception thereof) among riparians, 
rather than necessarily translating into conflictual hydropolitics, scarcity simply puts water 
on the agendas of presidents and prime ministers and makes it a high politics, foreign policy 
concern rather than solely the subject of domestic, technical management. While in some 
cases, scarcity can prompt negative water relations, as is seen during the second period when 
perceived scarcity and competing river claims contribute to conflictual hydropolitics, it can 
also engender interactions on the cooperative side of the spectrum when other political, 
economic, and social relations among states are positive. This analysis thus contributes to 
more nuanced understandings how environmental conditions and existing relationships 
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Conclusion 
While the history of the Tigris-Euphrates improves our understanding of the specific 
factors that drive interstate water politics, a look at the basin since 2011 complicates and adds 
dimension and nuance to this picture, illustrating both the relevance of the preceding analysis 
and the limits of such a framework. 
Hydropolitics and Syria in Crisis 
2011 started off a promising year for Tigris-Euphrates hydropolitics. January 
heralded both an announcement that Turkish planners intended to build 18 cross-border dams 
in concert with neighbors Iraq, Syria, Iran, Georgia, Bulgaria, and Greece, with the specific 
intent of “disprov[ing] the water wars thesis.”414 And in February, construction began for 
Turkey and Syria’s much-anticipated Friendship Dam on the Orontes.415 However, these 
encouraging, positive dynamics were not to last. The Syrian government’s brutal crackdowns 
against graffiti artists in the country’s south that sparked widespread domestic uprising in 
March 2011416 brought the Syrian regime’s legitimacy into question and proved catastrophic 
for the Tigris-Euphrates riparians’ cooperative hydropolitics of the previous ten years.  
At the outbreak of the Syrian uprising, Turkey initially encouraged Assad to pursue 
reform.417 When it became clear that this path was a dead end,418 Erdoğan proclaimed that it 
was time for Assad “to go.”419 Turkey quickly reversed its friendly policies toward Syria, 
suspending dialogue and trade,420 imposing steep sanctions on the Syrian regime, and 
welcoming both Free Syrian Army (FSA) fighters and the Syrian National Council (Syrian 
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governing coalition, supported by the West) inside Turkish borders. 421 In response, the 
Syrian regime renewed support for PKK activities inside Turkey.422  
Water relations initially seemed more resistant to alienation than these other political 
links between the Turkish and Syrian states. As of 2012, the construction of the Friendship 
Dam was still a go despite the more general ‘end of Friendship’ between the two regimes in 
the final months of 2011.423 Similarly, Turkey initially decided against the possibility of 
cutting off water flow to Syria as part of the international sanctions regime against the 
increasingly unpopular Assad.424 However, a worsening drought at home425 and mounting 
chaos and violence in Syria426 prompted Turkey to begin to strangle Euphrates flow in May 
2014. By the end of June 2014, Turkey had closed its dam gates altogether,427 for the first 
time reducing Euphrates flow to a trickle.  
Water relations between Syria and Iraq have remained largely unchanged and 
somewhat neutral amidst the crisis in Syria. Primarily due to sectarian similarities between 
Syria’s ruling party and new leadership in Iraq,428 Iraq is standing by Syria, opposing 
sanctions, and providing an “economic lifeline” for the country.429 Under these conditions, 
water relations have neither dramatically improved nor deteriorated in the last five years. In 
contrast, Turkey and Iraq’s hydropolitical relationship has suffered amidst poor relations 
between Turkish leadership and Iraq’s new Shia regime.430 Following the theme of ethnic 
and ideological differences contributing to more conflictual water relations, Foreign Minister 
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Ahmet Davutoğlu, representing majority-Sunni Turkey, and Iraqi Shia spiritual leader, 
Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, reportedly squabbled over the water issue at a meeting in November 
2013, prompting al-Sistani to suggest that U.N arbitration was necessary for any peaceful 
resolution of the Tigris-Euphrates dispute.431 
ISIS: The New Kid on the River Bank 
In addition to new developments in interstate hydropolitics, Tigris-Euphrates 
dynamics since 2011 have been influenced by the rise and growing power of non-state actors. 
While there are a wide variety of groups at play in Iraq, Syria, and Turkey—including the 
PKK, FSA, al-Nusra Front, KRG, Kurdish Peshmerga fighters, and more—by far the most 
critical to this discussion is the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). ISIS’ debut in Tigris-
Euphrates hydropolitics has been equally as negative for the potential of cooperative basin 
management as it has been conceptually interesting for scholarly understanding of the role of 
water in conflict. In its brutal bid to construct an Islamic caliphate over the area of modern 
Iraq and Syria, water has functioned as one of the principle weapons in ISIS’s arsenal and 
control over the twin Mesopotamian rivers and associated infrastructure has been critical for 
the group’s territorial gains and state-building efforts.  
ISIS’s movement through Iraq and Syria has followed the paths of the Tigris and 
Euphrates rivers, the group prioritizing control of riverside cities and dams.432 Not only does 
following the water give ISIS access to a large number of settlements in Syria and Iraq (and 
the life resource itself in an increasingly dry region), but it also provides the group with two 
measures of control over Iraqi and Syrian citizenry: 1) with command of water resources, the 
threat of turning off the taps and restricting access makes water a potent weapon of coercion; 
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and 2) taking control of water infrastructure and the responsibility of supplying water for 
local populations provides a measure of legitimacy to a non-state group attempting to gain 
state-like authority.433 In a particularly potent example of ISIS’ use of water for political 
ends, the group rapidly closed the massive gates of the Iraqi Fallujah Dam on the Euphrates 
in April of 2014, causing water to overflow above and flooding 200 square miles of farmland 
and villages, destroying homes, and ruining crops. This aggressive manipulation of water 
both forced the retreat of Iraqi forces gaining ground on ISIS in Fallujah and left thousands 
of Shiites downstream without water.434 Having previously voiced intentions to deprive 
Shiite regions of water,435 this appears to be a targeted use of water in a coercive, conflictual 
manner, motivated by sectarian differences.436  
Clearly, through its own actions, ISIS is a potent threat to cooperative resolution of 
the Tigris and Euphrates water disputes. As a non-state actor, ISIS is not bound or obligated 
by any of the existing treaties and agreements in the basin, nor does the group seem 
concerned about accountability to states or organizations of the international system. ISIS 
also provides a danger to the potential for more permanent hydro-peace through the reactions 
the group elicits from states. It has been suggested that Turkey’s choice to close the gates of 
the Atatürk Dam and stop the flow the Euphrates in June 2014 was in part a politically 
motivated effort to deprive ISIS of a key resource in the Caliphate’s capital, Raqqa, and 
thereby debilitate the group’s functional capacity.437 Though Turkey’s actions successfully 
put pressure on ISIS, prompting threats from the group that “God willing if they [the Turkish 
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government] don’t open it [the dam], we’ll open it from Istanbul,”438 it has also had 
extremely damaging effects on water and electricity supply for civilians in Syria and Iraq.439 
Thus,both in its own actions impacting water management and those it elicits from riparian 
states, ISIS has had a negative impact on Tigris-Euphrates hydropolitics. 
A Peaceful Future? 
This brief analysis of more recent events in the Tigris-Euphrates basin illustrates that 
many conclusions drawn from my inquiry into basin politics from 1918-2010 hold true, 
despite dramatic changes in political circumstances in Syria and the addition of new, non-
state actors to the mix. In both interstate interaction and ISIS’ hydropolitics, sectarian and 
ideological differences once again emerge as important driving factors for water politics. 
New sectarian divisions between political leadership in Turkey and Syria precipitate these 
states’ deteriorating water relations, and ISIS’ hydro-aggression is somewhat motivated by its 
declared battle against Shiites. Similarly, we again see water following patterns of trade and 
relations among heads of state as worsening water relations complement the decline of 
economic ties and friendships among leaders in Turkey and Syria. Water undoubtedly 
remains a high politics issue, as evidenced by its discussion in key meetings between Turkish 
and Iraqi leadership such as Ahmet Davutoğlu and Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. And once again, 
real scarcity (in the form of drought in Turkey and the actual shutting off of Euphrates flow 
from Turkey into Syria) maintains water’s place in high politics.  
In the last five years, water has also largely conformed to the trend established in my 
previous analysis: hydropolitics reflect the character of overarching political trends. This is 
exemplified by the deterioration of water relations between Turkey and both Syria and Iraq 
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amidst declining diplomatic and economic relationships related to the Arab Spring in Syria 
and the rise of Shia leadership in Iraq. The continuation of construction of the Friendship 
Dam into 2012 despite Turkey and Syria’s divergence, however, illustrates a stickiness to 
hydropolitics that was not apparent in previous time periods. Though it is unclear from media 
reports whether dam construction continued past 2012 as bilateral relations further 
deteriorated, the simple fact that it extended beyond the official “end of friendship” between 
Turkey and Syria is significant. This, combined with the Turkish regime’s somewhat 
surprising willingness to draw attention to the dam as a mark of continued positive 
hydropolitics amidst its simultaneous criticisms of the Asssad regime, may illustrate 
something of a “partial institutionalization of water cooperation”440 not previously seen in the 
basin. Perhaps, if given the chance to further develop, such institutionalization could enable 
cooperative hydropolitics to resist oscillations in wider political relations. Unfortunately, it 
seems that Turkey’s 2014 choice to cut off water to Syria, combined with the rise of ISIS, 
make such promising cooperation unlikely at present. 
For its part, ISIS introduces a new and volatile dynamic into the Tigris-Euphrates 
mix. Non-state actors like ISIS (i.e. powerful extremist groups) often do not see themselves 
as bound by international norms or traditional mechanisms of dispute resolution in the 
current international system (such as treaties, informal agreements, or obligations to 
neighboring states). They thus may be less susceptible or subject to influence by external 
actors that might otherwise be able to positively influence hydropolitics (such as the UN, EU, 
etc.). The very fact that ISIS is attempting to conquer the territory of Iraq and Syria means 
that the group also threatens the systems of bureaucratic organization and water management 
that are important in encouraging and implementing cooperative agreements over water. 
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Combined with these discouraging facts, the extensive uncertainty surrounding the current 
and future control of the Tigris and Euphrates that ISIS brings to the table makes effective 
water management under such circumstances immensely difficult and positive water politics 
elusive. 
The picture painted here of the present conditions in the Tigris-Euphrates basin is not 
very pretty or promising for the prospects of positive, cooperarive hydropolitics in coming 
years. The fact that we have seen water politics follow broader trends of relations in a region 
where, historically, politics have been both remarkably violent and exceptionally volatile 
does not bode well for the future of water politics in the basin. In addition to this worrisome 
dynamic, climate change is only making water scarcer in this region.441 While this may not 
directly translate into conflictual hydropolitics, the combination of such environmental 
circumstances with the present political climate supplies the tinder and sparks for more 
widespread dispute and tension relating to water resources in the future. 
Despite this somewhat pessimistic final note, this paper contributes to our 
understandings of the complex interconnectivities between a basin’s diplomatic, economic, 
and social circumstances and its water politics. I have illustrated how Tigris-Euphrates 
hydropolitcs have fluctuated from low politics and cooperative interactions to high politics 
conflictual engagement and then remained in high politics but become more collaborative 
over the course of the 20th century and beginning of the 21st. I argue that the driving force for 
such oscillations stems from broad fluctuations in diplomatic relations, influence of external 
actors, economic ties, and the saliency of ethnic and ideological similarities and differences, 
thus reflecting a tendency of water politics to follow overarching political trends. My 
analysis of the role of scarcity in hydropolitical relationships as the driver for water’s 
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movement from low to high politics, but not necessarily towards conflict, adds to scholarly 
understandings of how tensions over water develop and the necessary conditions for more 
cooperative resolution of such disputes. While recent developments in the region and the 
growing impacts of climate change have altered the dynamics of the Tigris-Euphrates basin 
in the last five years, if the lessons of the past are any guide, the exigencies created by such 
changes will likely contribute to some more positive, cooperative hydropolitical trends and 
some more negative and conflictual. Although the future of the Tigris-Euphrates basin is 
uncertain, there is no doubt that just as the Twin Rivers first raised the question of the 
potential for water to spark wars 4,500 years ago, these rivers will once again be center stage 
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